We are excited to present the inaugural issue of the King’s Undergraduate Research Journal. The collection of articles that have been curated to form this publication are a synergy of the distinct relationship King’s students have with their professors and the deep levels of inquiry and debate that bring our campus to life. Most importantly, however, these articles are a reflection of every aspect of King’s that so eloquently allows students to grow as individuals, as academics, as leaders, and as members of a community.

The editors for this volume have worked tirelessly to extend the impact of our authors’ work by creating a publication that is engaging and accessible. In doing so, we have not limited ourselves to the path set out by existing publications, but rather, we have worked to be a fresh take on what an academic publication can be. Our efforts to do this can be seen through the research that we have selected, our digital presence, and the faces of our authors that we have kept central to everything we do.

With thanks to the King’s University Students’ Council, our authors and faculty advisors, and to you, our readers - without whom our publication could not exist, it is my greatest honor to introduce this collection of articles that exemplify undergraduate scholarship at King’s.

Sincerely,

CAMERON SHEELE
Founder / Editor-in-Chief, Honors Specialization in Political Science Minor in Economics
LETTER FROM THE ASSOCIATE ACADEMIC DEAN

We are delighted to introduce the inaugural edition of The King’s Undergraduate Research Journal, which features outstanding articles by King’s University College students from several of our academic departments. The editors have worked closely with the King’s faculty to identify several of the best papers our students have produced over the past academic year, based on criteria such as originality, analytic insight, innovativeness, and careful attention to empirical evidence and reasoned argumentation.

Since the papers span the many and varied lines of inquiry across the humanities and social sciences, the featured works reflect a remarkable diversity. Yet a common thread binds these contributions together, as per the words of Alfred Nobel: “One can state, without exaggeration, that the observation of and the search for similarities and differences are the basis of all human knowledge.” The articles contained herein reflect some rather profound interpretations of a great many facets of the human condition, as well as our perpetual quest for a more enlightened perspective on the challenges we must confront. We hope that our readers will be inspired by the thoughtful and engaging analyses of our King’s students accordingly.

Sincerely,

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SEARCHING FOR THE HUMAN SOUL IN AN EVOLUTIONARY WORLD
Introduction

In the mid-nineteenth century, Charles Darwin published his revolutionary work, *On the Origin of Species*, which led to a massive paradigm shift in society’s understanding of humanity and the natural world. No longer were human beings fashioned from the “dust of the earth” (Gen. 2:7) by the hands of their Creator. No longer were human beings set apart, enjoying “dominion over...all wild animals of the earth” (Gen. 1:26). The discovery of evolution shook the very foundations of traditional Christian anthropology and cosmology. In response, theologians have taken up the exciting challenge of reconstructing a Christian understanding of human origins since traditional claims are no longer tenable in an evolutionary framework. Many creative possibilities have been put forth, so I will take up the task of examining and evaluating some of the strategies employed by theologians to account for the human soul in light of evolution. I will begin with a very brief explanation of evolutionary theory, followed by the Catholic Church’s initial conservative reactions to this theory. I will then evaluate various theological strategies used to account for the human soul (i.e. Christian materialism, divine intervention, and emergent-soul theologies) with the aim of presenting Karl Rahner’s articulation of the emergent soul as the best way of speaking about the human soul within an evolutionary framework.

A Brief Explanation of Evolutionary Theory

Prior to the discovery of evolution, Christians believed that God individually fashioned and ordered each species to its proper end. With the advent of Darwinism, these assumptions have been put to rest. Where creatures were once able to boast of a divine blueprint, they must now attribute their design to the genetic mutations of their ancestors.

According to evolutionary theory, the vast array of species alive on earth has evolved from one single-celled organism affectionately known as LUCA (the “last universal common ancestor”) (Rice, 2011). As LUCA reproduced generation after generation, the genetic mutations that inevitably and randomly occur in reproduction began to accumulate in the offspring. Eventually, these accumulated mutations would be expressed visibly, resulting in variation within the species (Charlesworth, 2003). Over thousands of generations, the accumulation of variations would eventually give rise to a new species altogether. This process of differentiation, which happens differently on each branch of variation, accounts for the incredible biodiversity we enjoy today. According to this model, all creatures on earth are a family, distantly related through our shared ancestry in LUCA (Rice, 2011). Human beings are not exempt from this story; although it may shake our anthropocentric ideals of intrinsic superiority, we too owe our existence to lowly, little LUCA.

The Catholic Church’s Reaction to Evolution

Such an account of human origins looks quite different from what is presented in the Genesis narratives. Since evolution affects human origins and therefore human dignity, the Catholic Church was wary of embracing this doctrine right away. The first statement made by the Church about evolution was in 1950 by Pope Pius XII. In his encyclical *Humani Generis*, he does not forbid Catholics from accepting evolution “in as far as it inquires into the origin of the human body as coming from preexistent and living matter...” (no. 36). However, he clarifies that, “the Catholic faith obliges us to hold that souls are immediately created by God” (no. 36). Through this language of “immediate creation”, Pius XII promotes a model in which God acts directly in creation, individually imbuing each human being with a handcrafted soul (Haught, 2001).

In 1996, John Paul II issued another significant statement concerning evolution. In his address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, he affirms that evolution is “more than a hypothesis,” (no. 5) but like his predecessor, he reiterates, “…if the origin of the human body comes through living matter which existed previously, the spiritual soul is created directly by God” (no. 5). Again, we see the Church’s desire to retain a special divine origin for the human soul.
Pius XII and John Paul II have good reason to preserve the distinct origins of the soul; they are concerned with protecting the unique dignity of humanity. If John Paul II believes that “it is by virtue of his eternal soul that the whole person, including his body, possesses such great dignity” (1996, no. 5), then it is not surprising that he would attribute this soul to the immediate and intentional work of the Creator. He concludes, “…the theories of evolution which...regard the spirit either as emerging from the forces of living matter, or as a simple epiphenomenon of that matter, are incompatible with the truth about man” (1996, no. 5). Pius XII and John Paul II are wary of the soul emerging from matter for fear of it being reduced to a mere epiphenomenon (that is, a secondary byproduct) and thereby stripped of its unique dignity (Edwards, 2014). Therefore, they reason: we can say that the human body shares its origin with all other creatures, but the human soul must come from a divine source whence it receives its unique dignity. Given these seemingly definitive reactions from Church authorities, how have theologians gone about accounting for the human soul in an evolutionary world while remaining true to their Catholic faith?

Christian Materialism

Perhaps the most clean-cut way of dealing with the tension between immaterial soul and material evolution would be to do away with the soul entirely. This is the strategy of Christian materialism. According to Christian materialists, the human being is composed of a “single stuff” (Clark, 2014, p. 167); matter alone. The Christian materialist acknowledges God as pure spirit while regarding everything else as strictly material, completely devoid of immateriality. Christian materialists use scripture to support their view by opting for a formulation of ‘Hebrew holism’ – a materialist understanding where humanity is created entirely from the dust of the earth (Clark, 2014) – in contrast to the Greek model of the body-soul composite. A materialist strategy is certainly effective in relieving the tension between evolution and the human soul, for it removes the human soul from the equation, thereby alleviating the tension entirely.

However, although the tension may be alleviated, the equation is left sorely unbalanced. As neat and tidy as Christian materialism may be, it cannot fully account for the human experience. Interestingly, it is not just theologians who want to hold onto this immaterial part of humanity; certain scientists also take issue with the idea of reducing the human person to mere matter. Human geneticist Gerard M. Verschuuren outlines an error of strict materialist neuroscience. He notes that science depends upon the rationality of the human mind. If the immaterial human mind were to be reduced to the brain (as a materialist would contend) and therefore be entirely subject to the interactions of atoms, then any thought would merely be the result of physical forces interacting at a given time and place. There would be no subjectivity or freedom in thought; we would be unable to think anything other than what we are already thinking, for materialism and determinism go hand in hand. In Verschuuren’s words (2012), “If thoughts were merely the product of bodily and other natural actions, all thoughts would be equivalent, and we would have no way of telling the true from the false” (p. 164). If this is so, then any arguments for materialism would bear no weight. Verschuuren is amused by this internal contradiction of materialist thought. He says, “It amazes me how evolutionists like to downgrade the human mind while touting their own minds” (p. 164). If rationality is to retain any of its integrity, then the human mind cannot be reduced to the physical brain.

Another issue with a materialist understanding of humanity is its failure to account for subjective human experience. Kelly James Clark (2014) uses pain as an example to show the difference between subjective experience and physical processes. He says, “Neither the brain activity nor the chemical processes are the pain itself” (p. 167). However, if a Christian materialist were to remain consistent, the materialist would have to contend that pain “is more than caused by a particular formation of neurons in the brain, it just is a particular formation of neurons in the brain” (p. 170). Although there are correlations between physical processes and the subjective experience of pain, scientists have found no adequate explanation of the mental experience in the physical realm.
articulates this disparity between material processes and subjective experience:

[R]eductive materialism seems incapable of accounting for the subjective quality of what it is like to experience mental phenomena; it seems to leave out the felt qualities of our sensations. Indeed, one of the most devastating shortcomings of materialism is that third-person physical descriptions (of chemical processes or neuronal configurations) cannot, in principle, adequately represent first-person subjective experiences or states – the feel of a feeling, the sensation of a colour, the sadness of an emotion. Feelings, sensations, and emotions refuse reduction. (p. 173)

A similar problem with materialism relates to the human capacity for memory. If you were to witness the most glorious of sunsets, you have the capacity to treasure that experience in your memory; you can recall both the image and the feelings it evoked. However, if a neuroscientist were to scour your brain, he or she would remain unable to access the image or the feeling of that sunset. They may be able to identify which emotions that memory is associated with, but there remains a fundamental chasm between the mental world of the subject and the physical world of the third-party (Clark, 2014). For the sake of avoiding relativism and determinism, and to preserve the subjective human experience, many scientists and theologians rightly reject Christian materialism and maintain that there is an immaterial aspect to humanity – whether that be ‘mind’ or ‘soul’, a rose by any other name smells just as sweet.

**Interventionist Theologies**

Another means of explaining the emergence of the human soul is through divine intervention. Admittedly, this way of thinking is considered outdated by many contemporary theologians, but since many people still hold onto this belief, it is worth addressing.

Richard W. Gleason, for instance, looks to the biblical creation story of Adam and Eve and argues that God created Adam’s body by subjecting an animal to a series of rapid genetic mutations until it assumed a human form. Only then was it made “suitable for the infusion of a divinely created soul” (O’Leary, 2006, p. 168). Therefore, according to Gleason, the emergence of the human body and soul was due to God’s special intervention in creation (O’Leary, 2006).

Gleason’s account of human evolution is quite problematic. Even if you were to overlook his over-literal interpretation of Genesis, there are many shortcomings inherent to an interventionist theology which have led to the development of non-interventionist models of divine action. An interventionist theology is one that allows for God’s special intervention in the created world (e.g. God could stop the rain, force a genetic mutation, or move a mountain if He felt so inclined). Karl Rahner exposes the problematic nature of an interventionist God by putting forth two reasons to reject God’s “special intervention” in the created world. The first reason for rejecting an interventionist God is to preserve God’s transcendence. According to Rahner, if God were to intervene in the created world by individually inserting handcrafted souls into human bodies, it would make God “an agent like other agents, acting in specific finite ways in the causal order of the universe” (Barnes, 1994, p. 91). In other words, interventionist action would demote God from His position as Primary cause to a mere secondary cause – that is, from His position as the Ultimate Being who sustains the very existence of all created things, to just another inertial force acting within creation. Rahner’s second reason for rejecting an interventionist explanation for the human soul lies in the complexities that arise in extraordinary cases. For instance, “If a human zygote split into twins, does God then have to intervene to create an extra soul? Is God bound to create a soul for pregnancy that is a result of rape or test tube fertilization” (Barnes, 1994, p. 92)? As soon as the soul is said to be added to the human body at a particular time, things become complicated. For these reasons, Gleason’s interventionist account of the origins of the human soul is untenable.
Theologies of an Emergent Soul

Twenty years ago, Pope John Paul II explicitly rejected any claims of the human soul arising from evolution. He said, “...the human soul, on which man’s humanity definitively depends, cannot emerge from matter, since the soul is of a spiritual nature” (1986). However, theologians such as Karl Rahner and John F. Haught have worked to expand our concept of matter in such a way that would allow for an immaterial soul to emerge from matter without losing its inherent, God-given dignity.

Before diving into theologies of the emergent soul, let us consider the perspective of neuroscience lest these theologies be dismissed as blind, outlandish conjecture. In the world of neuroscience, the ‘mind’ is the immaterial locale of human consciousness, subjectivity, and thought – similar to the theologian’s ‘soul’. Michael Gazzaniga provides a model of the emergent mind that translates quite smoothly into our theological discourse. According to his model, the mind depends on the brain for its existence, but it also constitutes “a new level of organization and control” (Edwards, 2014, p. 117) that goes beyond that of the brain. Our capacity for consciousness arises from the underlying neuronal, cell-to-cell interactions. Therefore, the mind is “a somewhat independent property of the brain while simultaneously being wholly dependent on it” (Gazzaniga, 2011, p. 130).

Neuropsychologist Malcolm Jeeves also endorses an emergent model of the mind. He speaks of the mind as having “its own causal activity” (Edwards, 2014, p. 120) – that is, its own agency. William Hasker uses the analogy of a magnetic field to illustrate the emergence of the mind from the brain:

A magnetic field is something above and beyond the magnet itself. The magnetic field cannot be reduced to the magnet itself. An extremely intense magnetic field has within it the power (via gravity) to hold together, even in the absence of the magnet that created it. According to emergent dualism, while the mind is an independent entity, it is not an entity that is inserted from the outside. (Clark, 2014, p. 177)

This formulation of the emergent mind (or soul), which allows the mind its own agency, would certainly quell John Paul II’s fear of the soul being reduced to a mere epiphenomenon.

We can see shared themes between Rahner’s emergent-soul theology and this type of emergent-mind neuroscience. Karl Rahner begins his case for the emergent soul with a rejection of any sort of interventionist statements concerning the “immediate” and “direct creation” of the human soul (Barnes, 1994). He then reworks the papal language of “immediate creation” to fit into a non-interventionist framework. In his reformulation, he interprets “immediate” as referring to God’s immanent presence, using it geographically rather than temporally (Barnes, 1994). Rahner also provides a nuanced interpretation of the Church’s use of “creation”. Instead of referring to a collection of separate acts throughout history, Rahner understands creation as a trajectory of God’s one, continual act. In other words, the event of creation was not a one-time event; rather it is an ongoing process. According to Rahner, when God created the world, He instilled in it an orientation toward self-transcendence, a motion that is propelled by the immanent presence of the Holy Spirit (Barnes, 1994). Using this framework, we can say that the human soul is an “immediate” creation of God: it has emerged through the ongoing process of self-transcending creation, which God sustains through His immediacy.

A key question still remains: how is it possible for an immaterial entity (i.e. mind, soul) to emerge from a material process? Rahner responds to this conundrum by calling into question what exactly is meant by “matter”. If an immaterial entity comes into being through the development of a material substance (i.e. as we see with the evolution of the human mind), then perhaps that material substance had immaterial properties all along – and this is precisely how Rahner views matter. According to Rahner, “…matter is in a certain way ‘solidified’ spirit…” (Rahner, 1965, p. 92). He says, “[It] must, after all, be quite spiritual” and “materiality itself must be understood as the lowest stage of spirit” (Rahner, 1988, p. 28-29). In short, matter is as much immaterial as it is material, and it is from this spiritual dimension of matter that
the soul can emerge. Barnes articulates Rahner’s theory as such: “The soul is what matter becomes when matter actively transcends itself under the general dynamic influence of God” (Barnes, 1994, p. 94). God’s immediate presence allows creation to transcend itself continually until this ‘frozen’ matter thaws into spirit. This understanding of the emergent soul requires no special divine intervention; rather, souls can come into being through natural processes. Rahner specifies that this soul-creating power does not belong to matter “in light of its materiality, that is, that mode of being which consists of a spatial and temporal limitedness” (Barnes, 1994, p. 93). Instead, this power to create souls originates from God’s dynamism, which is present and active in the self-transcendence of all matter.

Rahner’s model of the emergent soul is brilliant; it creatively explains how an immaterial soul could emerge from a supposedly material world while remaining coherent with the modern sciences and evading common theological pitfalls. For instance, Rahner’s theory completely obliterates any risk of falling into an unhealthy dualism since he reconceptualizes matter and spirit as intrinsically inseparable. Furthermore, this redefinition of matter as a material-immaterial substance removes the need for any special divine intervention to bring about the soul. In this way, Rahner preserves God’s transcendence and sidesteps the extraneous complexities of extraordinary circumstances concerning the human soul (e.g. zygote splitting, in vitro fertilization, etc.). In a sense, Rahner takes the Catholic doctrine of the human oneness of body and spirit and extends it to all of creation. Now all matter can boast of a sense of immateriality; each atom proclaims a spiritual pulse, bearing the invisible fingerprint of the Spirit-Creator who brought it into being. Moreover, Rahner’s articulation graciously provides a way for the Church’s initial language of “immediate creation” to be applicable to contemporary theology.

To further strengthen Rahner’s model, I would supplement it with the thoughts of John F. Haught whose articulations seem to better preserve the unique dignity of the human person. Like Rahner, who attributes a spiritual nature to creatures beyond humanity, Haught (2001) acknowledges something analogous to the soul in every living being – it is the “animating principle” of every living body. However, the degree of this ‘soul’ varies between organisms depending on their level of biological complexity. He writes, “The Spirit of God [is] present in all of life, animating each species in a manner proportionate to its characteristic mode of organic or informational complexity” (p. 28). The human soul, then, does not stand apart from other living creatures, but it is still able stand above them as the “most intense exemplification” (p. 28) of this spiritual interiority due to its unique biological complexity.

Supplementing Rahner’s thoughts with Haught helps to reconcile humanity’s awkward position as being part of creation and yet distinguished within creation. Although Rahner’s theory does provide a privileged position for humanity through their distinct ability to transcend themselves, Haught’s articulation allows for a more tangible gradation amongst creatures; the immaterial dimension of matter increases in organization and capacity in proportion to the organism’s biological complexity.

However, I would then supplement Haught’s thought with that of Karl Rahner. Haught professes a ‘soul’ within every living being as its animating principle. Rahner, on the other hand, claims that immateriality is inherent to all matter – living and non-living. The extension of immateriality to non-living matter is important, otherwise the question of the origin of immateriality would persist. For example, in Haught’s model, the animating soul is present in living creatures but not in non-living matter. His model explains the emergence of the human soul as a more complex version of what was already present in other living creatures. So the question arises again: at what point did this animating principle arise and where did it come from? Haught’s model simply pushes the question of the soul back to the least complex living being, which leaves the door open for divine intervention as an explanation. Rahner’s model closes the door on divine addition of immateriality along the way.
The strength of Rahner’s argument is also made apparent through its shared themes with other creation-centered spiritualities beyond the Christian tradition. When John Paul II (1996) wrote to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, he affirmed that the theory of evolution was far more than a hypothesis. After acknowledging the substantial body of scientific evidence, he also noted that the independent convergence of various disciplines on the matter of evolution lends to its credibility. He says,

In fact it is remarkable that [evolution] has had progressively greater influence on the spirit of researchers, following a series of discoveries in different scholarly disciplines. The convergence in the results of these independent studies – which was neither planned nor sought – constitutes in itself a significant argument in favour of the theory. (no. 4)

This principle of independent convergence can also be applied to Rahner’s explanation of the emergent soul. Although we have no evidence from scientific research scouring matter for any hint of immateriality (and rightly so, since the immaterial is outside the realm of science), we can see evidence of convergent thought in native spirituality. Take, for example, the Inuit people. According to their belief, “all things are imbued with a form of spirit” (O’Murchu, 2012, p. 90). The Mayan people also believe that “every being – living and nonliving – has a creative spirit. They call this creative spirit the ‘Great Mystery’” (p. 93). Finally, Diarmuid O’Murchu (2012) writes, “The Spirit is not equivalent to material or cosmic creation, yet the Spirit dwells deeply within all that exists – energizing, animating, and sustaining everything in the process of being and becoming” (p. 93). These articulations of native spirituality are strikingly similar to Rahner’s articulation of God’s immediacy and His ongoing creation through the Spirit. According to John Paul II’s principle of independent convergence, then, the similarity of these independent truths “constitute in [themselves] a significant argument in favour of the theory” (John Paul II, 1996, no. 4).

One final advantage of Rahner’s cosmic model of the emergent soul is its anti-binarial nature. In order to explain the evolutionary emergence of the human soul, Rahner essentially ‘queers’ matter. He questions societal assumptions about what matter is and dismantles the binary of material/immaterial by claiming that everything material is also fundamentally immaterial. Society has recently come to embrace this art of dismantling binaries to better fit our experience of reality. This trend would certainly make Rahner’s model attractive to those who are intrigued by queer theory, but it could also be yet another example of converging thought, indicating that he is on the right track toward what is good and true.

### Concluding Thoughts

Although we will never be able to claim absolute certitude regarding the nature and origin of the human soul, analyses of this sort are far from irrelevant. How human beings understand the nature and origin of their souls affects how they interact with the created world. Rahner’s emergent soul theology puts forth a model in which humanity shares a deep solidarity with the rest of creation. Since all of creation is made of the same “stuff” and shares that same dynamic, spiritual pulse, then all of creation ought to be treated with equal reverence. With the influence of Haught’s articulation of the soul, humanity might finally understand what it means to have “dominion over…all wild animals of the earth” (Gen. 1:26). Being part of the greater community of all created beings, humanity is not set apart from creation, but is set apart within creation. This dominion is not at all like the farmer who drives his oxen for his own use, but rather like the older sibling who, having more age and wisdom at their disposal, keeps a constant eye out for their younger brothers and sisters. Rahner’s theology gives humanity permission to preserve that sense we have of being more than mere atomic interactions, incapable of being reduced to a scientific equation. We are matter, and yet matter is more. If emergent soul theology were embraced and promulgated, all that could come of it would be healing: healing between humanity and the rest of the created world, and healing within a humanity whose spirits refuse to be reduced to materiality alone.
References


COMPLICATIONS OF THE GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOUR ACCORDING TO FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
Introduction

Although women in North America have more opportunities in the present day compared to the past, they are still not fully able to take advantage of these opportunities, nor be as economically secure as men due to the on-going gendered division of labour. The gendered division of labour causes many problems in society. In this paper, I will argue along feminist lines that contemporary society is unjust due to the gendered division of labour and the issues of inequality and poverty that result from it. I will begin by providing a brief analysis of what the gendered division of labour is, and the impacts it has on women’s lives, followed by dissecting the various forms of inequality it creates and the poverty that results from it.

The Gendered Division of Labour

The gendered division of labour is comprised of both gender norms and roles. Gender, which is the social construction of what it means to be male or female, has socially prescribed attributes. Essentially, one’s biological sex is translated into specific labour roles (Hartmann, 1979, p. 9). The attributes of women supposedly being caring and nurturing, and men being ambitious and intellectual, are common expectations that show how the basis of the gendered division of labour is formed. Since men are seen as ambitious and intellectual, and women as caring and nurturing, naturally jobs outside of the home are expected of men, whereas, the domestic and caregiving housework is expected of women. This historical expectation of what men and women are supposed to contribute to the household continues today. However, in present day not only are more women working outside of the home – which includes nearly 73% of Canadian women with children under the age of 16 at home in 2009 compared to only 39% in 1976 (Farrao, 2015) – but they are still expected to perform the bulk of household and caring duties as well. This is not only limiting to women, but to men as well, as these gender norms and values influence what is expected of men (i.e., working outside of the home and not staying home taking care of their children). The impact that the gendered division of labour has on women affects their ability to balance their paid and unpaid labour. Canadian women work an average of 10.5 more hours a week inside the home than men do (Organisation for Economic and Co-operation Development, 2017). All of this is caused by the norms and values perpetuated by the gendered division of labour and contemporary society’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the roles prescribed to women who are in heterosexual relationships. These norms are so strong and engrained within society that it is even difficult to say that women within partnerships where both partners are choosing to subscribe to the traditional division of labour are freely choosing and consenting to this. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind how social constructions of gender can influence choices and decisions among both men and women leading to certain outcomes.

Inequality

The most prominent inequality that results from the gendered division of labour is the amount of work women are performing compared to that of men. As mentioned above, women work an average of 4.2 hours a day of unpaid, domestic work compared to that of only 2.7 hours that men perform (Organisation for Economic and Co-operation Development, 2017). This is clearly not equal. Women are contributing more to the household in terms of domestic work and caregiving when they are also working outside of the home. This is unjust because men and women should be equal in status and social position, and to be equal in status means to be equal in contribution of household duties. Even if household and caregiving duties are not split directly in half, to have both partners contributing as much as they can will make it easier for this equality to be reached. So by having the expectation that domestic labour and caregiving is a woman’s responsibility, the gendered division of labour undermines the notion of equality. Also, by women doing the majority of the unpaid labour, they then suffer the consequences of not having as much “down” time as their partner which has consequences on both their health and well-being and participation within the market.
Since women spend a lot of their time at home doing the cooking, cleaning, and raising of children, they are often left with little time to pursue other activities. Nancy Fraser refers to this lack of time as “time poverty.” Which is essentially the notion that one has an inadequate amount of time to partake in other meaningful life activities such as hobbies, sports or simply relaxation and rejuvenation from both the paid and unpaid labour one has to do (Fraser, 1997, p. 47). As of 1997, 52% of women said that they felt tired most of the time compared to the 21% men who said this (Fraser, p. 47). This finding can be attributed to the amount of work women perform, both paid and unpaid. However, it is the unequal sharing of household duties and care work that results in this finding. This clearly demonstrates how women suffer from the gendered division of labour in comparison to men. Women do not enjoy the same amount of time to pursue other activities of importance and interest as their male counterparts. This is not because they have decided to do more of the domestic work, but rather because they have been socialized to do so. The very fact that so many women feel that they must do this labour, even though their male partner is just as capable, lead to them feeling more tired than their male partners. The feeling of fatigue is a result of the prescribed household and familial duties that women feel is their responsibility. They may believe that the household and family would not operate as efficiently as it once did if they gave up this responsibility, unless the male counterpart began to share the duties leaving the woman with more time for herself.

Not only are women left with feelings of exhaustion and burnout as a result of the time poverty that the gendered-division of labour creates, but they also risk being left with little time to further their education or pursue occupational training to better their chances in the employment field when balancing both their paid and unpaid labour. As will be discussed shortly, women already face rare and challenging opportunities for promotions due to the gendered division of labour, but they also encounter this because of the lack of time they have to invest in their potential. Because of the time constraints that women face due to working two different shifts, one paid and one unpaid, they face barriers time-wise for engaging in learning and/or training that would further develop their skill sets for the workplace as compared to men (Quinlan, 2006, p. 3). This has adverse effects on women’s career development and promotions due to lack of time they feel they can invest within their career, as can be seen by women only making up 1% of the highest earning CEOs. In addition, they will then lag behind the men who are able to dedicate more time towards their professional development. This has a profound effect on women since it is already difficult for women within specific job fields to be promoted due to the gendered ideas of what women are suitable for. This inequality will cause this problem to worsen, as women will then not be considered as “marketable,” especially within already male-dominated fields (Quinlan, 2006, p. 7). Additionally, without having said training, women are less likely to reap the economic benefits that come with the training, like an increase in pay (Quinlan, 2006, p. 4).

Moreover, women are not only limited in their opportunities to receive promotions or to be hired because of lack of time to receive additional training and/or learning within their job field, but also because of the time off that they may require for caregiving duties. Since women are perceived and expected to be responsible for caregiving and the domestic labour that comes along with it, they often need to take time off from their paid work. Whether it is for maternity leave, a sick child, or an ailing parent, the socially prescribed gender roles that have historically faced woman, largely result in them being responsible for tending to these instances of need. This is not fair to women because this responsibility places an unequal amount of work upon them in comparison to their partner, but also because it means that they are taking time off...
from paid labour, which can result in both a reduced chance to be promoted and a reduction in earnings in comparison to a man. Businesses tend to promote and hire the individuals who can dedicate the majority of their time to continual, uninterrupted work, as this will lead to more economic output and, thus, more profit – the ultimate goal of business (Roth, 2009, p. 26). And since women, for the most part, are generally in charge of caregiving activities, requiring time off, they are less likely to be considered ideal workers and therefore, less likely to acquire promotions or new jobs (Roth, 2009, p. 26). As a result, workplaces tend to discriminate against women for being more likely to take time off work than men leading to a major pattern of inequality. Neoliberal workplaces are not set up to be accommodating of the fact that women are not as able to be continuously engaged in their work. Such workplaces place emphasis on employees’ human capital, which in this case is their ability to be continuously and fully engaged in said work as this encourages economic prosperity on the workplace’s behalf. Thus, it is not inherently a woman’s fault that she falls behind men at work, but rather the institutional structure that prevents women from succeeding.

Additionally, since women are not as likely to be continuously employed due to the caregiving duties that they are engaged in, they do not reap the economic benefits that come from steady full-time work. Pensions are better the longer one works, and promotions often come with pay raises. Thus, by not being able to be continuously engaged in the labour force, women lose out on the economic benefits that their male colleagues are able to enjoy, such as only earning 72 cents to that of a man’s dollar (Canadian Women’s Foundation, 2015, p. 1). This is not just as, once again, it is not necessarily women’s intentions not to be continuously employed and thus reap the benefits of doing so. It is the social expectation that women are the caregivers and take time away from work to participate in caring work that causes it. And it is not right that women are subsequently unable to enjoy the economic benefits of doing so as men are due to this social expectation. Without workplaces accounting for the fact that the gendered division of labour is the cause of this and not allowing women to have the same economic opportunities as men, an inequality results.

**Poverty**

Due to the worse opportunities for paid work that women possess as a result of the gendered division of labour, they also are more likely to face poverty. The feminization of poverty, that is, the fact that women are more likely to experience poverty than men, is, to a large degree, rooted in the gendered division of labour. Since women take more time off work due to the gendered division of labour, they are not able to earn as much as their male partners, and they do not have the chance to achieve a higher-paid work position (Gornick & Meyers, 2009, p. 9). Both of these situations can contribute to poverty. In addition, due to the unequal allotment of unpaid work between men and women, women’s incomes are not close to matching their partners. There is currently no OECD country where women’s incomes match that of their partners. Countries that are the closest in matching are the Nordic ones in which women contribute about 34-38% of the shared income between them and their partners (Gornick & Meyers, 2009, p. 10). This demonstrates how women tend to make significantly less money in comparison to their partner. The effect this has on women’s lives is troubling as it not only causes women to rely upon men in order for their physical needs to be met, leading to the impediment on women’s independence, but it also means that women are at a greater risk for poverty when leaving a partnership (Okin, 1989, p. 17). For example, between the years of 1999 to 2004, 25% of women who separated or divorced entered low-income status compared to only 10% of men (Gadalla, 2008, p. 233).

In addition, women are at a greater risk of poverty due to the types of paid labour they do. Many jobs women enter are aligned with what the gendered division of labour sets out. That means that since women are supposed to be caring and nurturing, they are socialized from a young age to aim for and fulfill jobs that by their nature offer opportunities for caring and nurturing. For example, typically female jobs such as early childhood educators and personal support workers are usually paid significantly less than jobs deemed to be masculine like construction and engineering (Weisgram, Bigler & Liben, 2010, p. 780). In 2009, 67% of women were employed within a traditionally female job (Ferrao, 2015).
And even though promoting women to enter the masculine-deemed science, technology, engineering and mathematics fields will hopefully breakdown the economic disparity that results from women not entering the higher paid, “masculine sectors,” sectors that are mainly fulfilled by women need to be paid well too. The pay for these types of jobs is often very little and needs to be increased so that those occupying these positions are able to be more financially secure. Thus, more value needs to be given to the caring and nurturing jobs.

Lastly, since the expectation that caregiving and domestic duties are placed upon women, women often need to make the choice between staying home or working outside of the home. Many women do like to work outside the home, but with the amount of labour that is expected of them inside the home, some women opt to work part-time. However, part-time work is typically not as economically sustainable as full-time work due to the lower wages associated with it within neoliberal North America. Full-time work also tends to offer benefits such as health insurance and vacation time, benefits not offered for part-time work (Rosenfeld & Birkelund, 1995, p. 111). In addition, this effect is compounded by the expense of childcare. In North America, childcare is expensive relative to household income. In Toronto, Ontario, full-time childcare for a child between the ages of 1.5 and 3 years old costs $1,375 a month. (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016, p. 15). This is an expense that can prove to be inaccessible for some families and women which means that women may look at either working and having a significant portion of their income go to child care expenses, or engaging in unpaid work at home in order to provide childcare themselves with no expense – which often results in a perpetuation of poverty in itself. Nevertheless, women do want and often need part-time work for financial and personal satisfaction. However, part-time work, at least in the North-American context, is rarely satisfactory with the amount of money that it provides.

Conclusion

Taking into consideration the effects that the gendered division of labour has upon women within a heterosexual relationship, the results are clearly not just. Due to the considerable amount of time women spend doing the domestic, unpaid labour and childcare in comparison to their male counterparts, inequality and the feminization of poverty results. The various dimensions of inequality this paper explores coupled with the increased likelihood women are to experience poverty, demonstrates that contemporary North American society cannot claim to be truly feminist or egalitarian. In order for a feminist society to exist, society must abolish the gendered division of labour as it controls many aspects of life as discussed. Or if the gendered division of labour is still to exist, to prevent the inequality and poverty that results from it, society should at least be understanding and accommodating of what the gendered division of labour requires of women, in order for women not to experience the negative repercussions of doing so.


AN ACCOUNT OF ETHICAL EVOLUTION
Introduction

In the course of human affairs, individuals, their values, and the political systems by which they establish and engage in cooperative behaviour become violently ruptured by evil that catalyzes their evolution. As the theorizing of principles of right human conduct over time, ethics must account for these ruptures. In this paper, I provide a theory of ethical evolution as an authentic response to these ruptures. To do this, I synthesize Vladimir Jankélévitch’s irrationalist ethics of remorse and forgiveness with a politicized, rationalist conception of reparational justice, with theoretical guidance from John Dewey and John Rawls. I create a philosophically balanced and potent theory of the ethical evolution of human beings as they increase their ethical resiliency and cultivate ethical reparation after having experienced evil. Reparation in this context is not simply a restoration and return to a state that was before; it is a holistic movement of thriving becoming, a temporal evolution of a people and their values, for having suffered evil (Daly). I demonstrate how Jankélévitch’s penetrating insights into psychological ethics, coupled with Dewey’s political justice, is highly profitable for the goal of repairing the lives of those affected by evil, and to prevent and prepare against evil in the future. The purpose of this project is to expose the virtue of suffering and to reconcile the psychological and temporal aspects of Jankélévitch’s thought, with a pragmatic and political concern for how human beings respond to the evil that ruptures their worlds.

This paper is composed of two parts. In the first part, I lay out the philosophical importance of this project, along with the basic structure of it. I establish the foundation for the necessity of an ethical theory that can account for the rationality and irrationality, and also the publicness and privateness, of the human condition. Crucially, I highlight the importance of ethical evolution as the holistic temporal structure by which human beings reconfigure their values in response to evil. I show how this is related to a conception of evil that causes symptomatic ruptures of psyche, values, and temporal becoming. Evil evades an absolute definition as it mutates according to time and place. However, we can recognize the symptoms of it in these worldly ruptures. The second and larger part is where I unfold the dynamic structure of ethical evolution and show how it manifests in its two elements of ethical reparation and ethical resiliency. In detail, I describe the tripartite equiprimordial moments that constitute ethical evolution: 1) the remorse of the offender, 2) the forgiveness of the offended, and 3) the justice of the adjudicator. I make clear how the virtuality of being better people is on the basis that we do suffer, that we do experience evil which ruptures our worlds and challenges our perceptions of what it means to be good people. Agreeing with Jankélévitch, human suffering is a virtue; it is the virtue that reignites the flames of our ethical values, “a prelude to great reforms,” so we may become ever more excellent in our own image (The Bad Conscience 47). Assuredly, ethical evolution is the temporal structure by which human beings and their values are righteously modified through suffering the mistakes of evil. As Jankélévitch says, “[s]ituations are modified along with the people who are in these situations… forgiveness is very much headed in the direction of evolution, which always forges ahead” (Forgiveness 13).
Part One:

The human being is a special creature. We can love and hate with the passionate intensity that leads to self-sacrifice and murder without any other single person fully capturing the intentions and motivations for our acts. Our individual psychological lives are so esoterically coloured that not even our lovers know the extent to which they make the blood flow through our hearts. Nonetheless, we are also creatures that cooperate with one another in attempts to make sense of love and hatred, and the acts that stem from these primal emotions. We come together in common understanding of expectations of behaviour, beliefs and desires; we can sensibly communicate our wants to one another. In Dewey’s words we can, “transfer [our] own content of significance,” and provide reasonable justifications for one thing in favor over another (PPSP 159). Of course, what I am talking about is the inherent distinction between the irrational and the rational, our private idiosyncratic lives and our public lives of routine convention. It is the case that over the course of modernity we have esteemed rationality over irrationality, but as Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider contend, “although both principles are logically exclusive, their opposition is constantly overcome in our lives.” (90). Both aspects have their place in human affairs, and one is not bodily, psychologically, or spiritually privileged over the other; they continually intersect in the course of daily living. This being the case, it is imperative that ethics can account for and incorporate these two separate, yet ontologically equal, components of the human condition in its structure.

As human beings, we are all victims to the irreversible passage of time that whisks by in spite of our attempts to grasp at anything firm, unchanging and fixed. Neither in the private mind nor in the public square of the town can we escape temporal becoming. Jankélévitch makes this abundantly clear when he says, “[a]ll is thus dragged along in the general movement of becoming” (Forgiveness 19). The lived experience of the human being is such that scruples of a remorseful person and the rancor of an offended person are anachronistic to temporal becoming, and yet, they can never withstand their revolt against time’s infinite authority. As Jankélévitch maintains, “time is almost as omnipotent as death, and time is more tenacious than the most tenacious of wills, for it is irreversible” (Forgiveness 16). Taking for granted that the rational-irrational composition of the human being is ultimately incapable of undoing or defying the irreversible flow of time, it also becomes paramount that our ethics espouse the facticity of temporality.

To be perfectly clear, for an ethical system to respect the dualistic nature of the human condition and the temporal facticity of becoming, it is necessary that it have a partitioned space for the irrational-private, and another for the rational-public, all the while accounting for the irreversible futurition of temporal becoming. If not, we do injustice to the total fullness of our being and run the risk of anachronistic preterition, unable to move into the inevitable future to overcome evil and ethically evolve. Considering the above, I now introduce my conception of evil, and relate it to Jankélévitch’s conceptions of remorse and forgiveness. I then expose the limitations of his thought, and incorporate reparational justice into it, in order to compensate for his theoretical shortcomings.

Neither in his work The Bad Conscience nor Forgiveness does Jankélévitch give an objective definition of what evil is. However, he does say that the psychological phenomenon of remorse indicates that one has committed evil. In other words, the human psyche knows evil when it suffers remorse from having committed evil; it feels the psychological symptom of evil as a rupture, “a rift” of general consciousness (Jankélévitch, The Bad Conscience 13). With this, we can securely
say that evil is related to the psychological. If it is related to the psychological, it is certainly related to how the psyche understands, interprets, and evaluates the phenomena encountered in its world. If evil is related to how the psyche understands, interprets, and evaluates its world, it means two things: 1) evil is structurally related to the value-system of a people and its classification of worldly phenomena, and 2) recognizing evil is not only within the purview of the remorseful person, but all of those with a psychological capacity to know their world and what is valuable to that world. Taking these two points for granted, I contend that evil causes a rupture in the values and temporal becoming of a people, just as it causes a rupture in the psyche of the remorseful offender. I further contend that people of shared values can bear witness to evil; they can recognize the rupture of their values and the daily humdrum of their ordinary lives, even though they may not be able to give a concrete name to the cause of the symptoms they bear witness to. This is absolutely the case for the victims of evil. Indeed, evil is an elusive demon that evolves alongside our values and it evades our attempts to give it a simple name. What we do know about evil are its symptoms - that it causes a rupture of psyche in the form of remorse, of values shared among a people, and in the temporal becoming of a people. Evil is an emergent phenomenon of rupturing that must be addressed by alleviating the symptoms that rupture the various aspects of our worlds before we can overcome evil to return to a state of normalcy.

Taking inventory of the first aspect of the psychological, irrational, and private aspects of humanity, Jankélévitch posits the notion that remorse and forgiveness ought to authentically accord with temporality, and avoid the scruples of consolation and obsessive rancor, respectively (Forgiveness 21). That is to say, if we are to be truly remorseful and forgiving, we cannot appeal to intellection, nor export our suffering upon some force of absolution, whether religious or otherwise. It is only by living through the painful experiences in a Bergsonian duration that remorse and forgiveness advance their pure, irrational potency towards overcoming evil. To Jankélévitch, intellectual consolation and rancor are the forces of preterition which obstruct futurition and the virtuality of evolution and overcoming evil; rancor “resists becoming” (The Bad Conscience 15). Indeed, this is the case. Psychologically dwelling upon the past affects the ability of people to overcome evil. They become locked in a past of repetitive hatred and resentment, anxiously awaiting God or some other absolute truth to save them from themselves. Nonetheless, the ruptures of psyche, values, and temporal becoming by evil announces the virtuality of ethical evolution, the beginning of a new and better world. Jankélévitch describes true remorse as, “the greatest virtue of which a wrongdoing soul is capable” (The Bad Conscience 140). This is because remorse is the beginning of being able “to do better another time! one can go beyond the misdeed and reach the other side” (The Bad Conscience 58). To complement remorse, forgiveness is a spontaneous gift that absolves the remorseful offender of their suffering. It permits the reparation of the psycho-temporal rupture that evil causes in the offender. The function of remorse and forgiveness within ethical evolution is not to make sense of evil, it is to live through and overcome it authentically in accord with temporality. The rational dissection and scruples of evil, along with the business of making amends and enforcing restitution, is left to the jurisdiction of justice.

Jankélévitch lacks a theory of the public that bears witness to evil in his account of remorse and forgiveness. He is unable to resolve the issue of the public’s role in dealing with the egregious affronts and ruptures to the values and goods of our world. Speaking practically,
neither remorse nor forgiveness can repay the debts that evil has caused, nor do they attempt to make sense of evil. They are only able to open up the virtuality for evolution through suffering and repair the psycho-temporal rupture caused by evil. If we wish to live in a society where we regain the property lost from a theft, or a sense of security from knowing a murderer is unable to kill again, it is absolutely required that we have an institutionalized system of reparational justice that ensures people can return to some semblance of a life they had before they were wronged, even though they will be changed forever. As Rawls says, “when infractions occur, stabilizing forces should exist that prevent further violations and tend to restore the arrangement” (6). It is imperative that we have an adjudicator, as a representative of the needs and values of the public, to augment the remorse of the offender and forgiveness of the offended (Dewey, TPP 146). This system of justice ought to be as objective and rational as humanly possible, concerned with the ethical and political values of the public, not the psychological and irrational. Jankélévitch makes it clear that justice has no place in the psycho-personal, and I agree with him. He says, “there exists an abyss that justice in itself does not at all ask us to traverse” (Forgiveness 63). This abyss is the abyss of the irrational and the psychological. But, as I show below, remorse, forgiveness, and justice together lead to ethical reparation and ethical resiliency, under the larger structure of ethical evolution. The purpose of justice is to ensure that wrongs are corrected; its function is to repair the rupture of values caused by evil in lieu of temporal becoming, just as the purpose of remorse and forgiveness is to repair the rupture of the psyche, as well as the psycho-temporal. Justice should not be an obstacle to becoming, but a rational force that expedites ethical evolution while also providing security for the general public. Because the public will never get to know the pain and the idiosyncrasies of the evil between the offender and the offended, it obliges the public to confront evil in a manner other than by irrational remorse and forgiveness, namely, through rational and reparational justice.

**Part Two:**

Having laid out the preliminary foundation for the explication of ethical evolution, I now discuss each equiprimordial moment of ethical evolution, and illustrate ethical reparation and ethical resiliency. I further demonstrate how the temporal rupture generated by evil is only fully repaired and overcome when ethical evolution occurs. In other words, the irrationality of remorse and forgiveness renovates the psychological rupture, and rational justice remedies the rupture of values. There are temporal aspects to both the psyche and our shared values, and the temporal aspect of each gets repaired by its respective ethical partition. But, for a total and complete repair of the temporal rupture, we need a holistic conjoining of all moments together in the form of ethical evolution.

There are three parties that emanate when evil is committed; each of these parties introduces a moment of ethical evolution. There is the offender that feels remorse, the offended who forgives, and the adjudicator who enacts justice. Each of these three parties can either be individuals, or collectives; there can be more than one offender, a number of those offended, and a singular or multiple mediating adjudicators. Each has the potential to generate a moment, that when considered all together, constitute the tripartite moments of the equiprimordial structure of ethical evolution. However, each can exist and function on its own without the association of the others. One can feel remorseful without being forgiven or brought to justice for their evil behaviour. One can forgive beyond a conception of justice without their offender feeling remorse. Justice can be served between the offender
and offended without either feeling remorse or giving forgiveness. This is often the case when the state is obliged to prosecute a suspect without the alleged victim filing formal charges. Justice often supersedes the will of suspects and victims as the legal representative of the public and its values, as they are codified in law (Rawls 209). Each moment of its respective party brings its own ethical power forth to confront evil. Yet, separately, they are impotent in confronting and mending the total of ruptures produced by evil. Only by integrating them into a single structure is it possible to authentically exercise the movement of ethical evolution, from which ethical reparation and ethical resiliency follow.

As I have been saying in accord with Jankélévitch’s position, remorse announces the virtuality of a new and better life; it is the human virtue necessary for the evolution of the psyche and overcoming evil. It is the psychic turning point in the ethical life of the offender toward the realization that evil exists, that we ought not commit evil deeds, and that we have the virtuality to be better people (The Bad Conscience 58). Remorse is nonetheless the most painful and sufferable of psychic experiences. Jankélévitch claims that, “[r]emorse is thus pure despair, and yet to have remorse is a symptom of recovery” (The Bad Conscience 161). That being said, there is no restoration to the psychic and ethical position one was in before remorse awakened them from the indifference of baseline consciousness. Real restoration is impossible after remorse (The Bad Conscience 54). Irreversibility and irrevocability are the primary attributes of remorse responsible for psychic suffering and for why we cannot be restored to a state of affairs that existed in a time before. Jankélévitch describes them as “two authentic torments: the anguish that is the torment of irreversibility, and the obsession that is the torment of irrevocability” (The Bad Conscience 55). By irreversibility, Jankélévitch is simply referring to the temporal impossibility of undoing an act, or reversing the directionality of time, and the acts committed over time. Irrevocability is a pathological repetition which dwells upon the evil deed. It is the desire to go back to a previous psychic state, and wish that the suffering will cease to be; it is scrupulous and obstructs the temporality of becoming. The fact that the offender cannot be restored means that he can only move forward and be changed forever for having done an evil deed. To truly accord with the flow of time, he must give in to “temporal forgiveness,” and allow himself to be moved along with his torturous suffering without appealing to intellection and consolation (Jankélévitch, Forgiveness 20).

Jankélévitch posits that consolation and rationalizing remorse leads to ethical limitation and inauthentic comforting. On this, he says, “[i]t is a question of empiricizing the meta-empirical wound… reducing it to traumatisms” (The Bad Conscience 66). In other words, by attempting to make sense of our suffering and to excuse our acts through scrupulous intellection, we reduce and limit the larger whole of the lived experience of our remorse and neglect the seriousness of evil. To Jankélévitch, rational intellection limits the ethical possibilities that, temporally and virtually, lie beyond suffering remorse. I concur with this position, partly. To discount the psycho-irrational would hinder our ethical possibilities, but I also think that disregarding the potential for rationality to have a meaningful impact upon our ethical lives is, in fact, ethical limitation - hence the necessity for justice as the representative of the ethical force of rationality. In any case, remorse should be left as an experientially lived, irrational component to ethical evolution which commences the inauguration of the virtuality of overcoming evil. The offender has no right to intellectualize their remorse; they feel it, and ought to feel it, as a consequence of their behaviour that violated the values etched into their psyche. There is no going back after evil has
been committed; there is only going forward into the future and remorse catalyzes the movement toward overcoming the evil done. What we take away from remorse in regards of ethical evolution is how it is the starting point for movement of evolution. Suffering remorse demands that change occurs, that evolution occurs. However, this is not something that can be done by the will of the offender. Forgiveness, as Jankélévitch says, is the human grace that absolves the offender of his remorse and permits evolution and the overcoming of evil (Forgiveness 34).

Jankélévitch makes the distinction between pure forgiveness and “apocryphal forgivings,” the most important of which is intellective excuse. Intellective excuse is a kind of forgiveness that holds rancor “that has not yet succeeded in resolving” (Jankélévitch, Forgiveness 20). As with remorse, forgiveness must be absent of any intellection, except the threshold required to know that one is forgiving. On this, Jankélévitch says, “for forgiveness, there is everything to forgive, and there is almost nothing to understand... [t]o forgive, indeed, is to understand a little bit!” (Forgiveness 88). By pure forgiveness, Jankélévitch means to say forgiveness that is not predicated upon a reason for why one would forgive another, unlike justice, as it is predicated upon the law. That is to say forgiveness must be spontaneous and out of abundant love for humankind. The purity of forgiveness is why Jankélévitch thinks that it is an event that has not yet come to pass in human history. However, I think that it would be limiting our ethical imagination to think that forgiveness is this far-out, fantastic, nearly impossible event that borders upon the metaphysical and transcendental. It would do much better for the purpose of overcoming evil, not to completely neglect the purity of forgiveness, but at least to give it the breathing room to be an event that human beings are capable of giving to a remorseful offender who has committed evil. I agree that forgiveness should not be predicated on a reason to forgive, and that it should be pure forgiveness and affirm itself tautologically on the basis of itself. Forgiveness forgives because it is forgiveness; it is pure, unaltered and without
formal prescription, unlike justice which has its origins in the codification of the reasonable law. Not only is forgiveness a pure moment, but it is “a gracious gift from the offender to the offended… a personal relation with another person” (Jankélévitch, Forgiveness 5). Between the offender and the offended exists a personal relation which the public has no access to in any respect. Certainly, this is the beauty of the irrational aspect of the human condition, but it is also a reason that justifies the role of the public in confronting evil. As Jankélévitch maintains, it is only on the basis of a personal, pure, gracious gift that forgiveness has its true potency to absolve the offender of remorse and to “[undo] the last shackles that tie us down to the past, draw us backward, and hold us down” (Forgiveness 15). Justice is not a gift to the offender, nor even to the offended; it is something different altogether. John Rawls said it most simply and profoundly on justice in the first line of his magnum opus A Theory of Justice, when he affirms, “[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (3). This powerful insight asserts that justice is the primary foundation for a social organization that can withstand the slings and arrows of erroneous acts of evil, just as truth must withstand the corruption of falsity. Justice is an impersonal, impartial, calculating ethical machine that bears witness to evil and responds to evil as a third party, representing the values of the public. It is the manifestation of the needs and will of the people as the will of the people is described and delineated in the law. Dewey compliments this claim of Rawls when he says, “[o]fficials are those who look out for and take care of the interests thus affected. Since those who are indirectly affected are not direct participants in the transactions in question, it is necessary that certain persons be apart to represent them, and see to it that their interests are conserved and protected” (TPP 16). These officials Dewey speaks of are, of course, adjudicators who specialize in jurisprudence. Adjudicators look out for the material and ideal interests of the offender, offended, and the public through justice. As the public is faced with evil, it is necessary that justice be institutionalized and represented by adjudicating officials, who to the best of their ability, enact punishments and reparations that accord with the value-system of the public through the law. Just as we have those who specialize in other forms of social institutions such as teachers who ensure the minimization of ignorance for the public, and doctors who protect the public against illness, we have adjudicators for whom justice and the prescription of law is their sole purpose as the bastion against evil for the public.

If we do not have institutionalized, rational justice, we bequeath all value judgements to the irrational psyche. The personal, irrational, and psychological aspects of humanity are ill-equipped to negotiate the intricacies of evil, and dissect evil acts in order to come upon an appropriate response that coheres with the value-system of the public. But this assessment goes both ways. We cannot simply have the rationalizing and independent machinery of justice that squashes the psychological, personal and irrational aspects of our nature. Neither the irrationality of the psyche, nor the rationality of justice should be subordinate to the other. Both should operate harmoniously in cohesion with the one another in a single effort to repair the lives of those affected by evil, and to prevent against evil in the future.

Speaking of forgiveness and its effects upon the law, Jankélévitch goes as far as to say that, “forgiveness from the heart fills all the instants of our social and private lives; it softens the intransigence of the law, [and] protects us from an inhumane eternity” (The Bad Conscience 145). I concur with him on this part, as I believe Rawls does as well when he says, “[t]he concept
of rationality by itself is not an adequate basis for the concept of right” (404). Indeed, to refuse Jankélévitch’s point would amount to saying that the irrational and rational components of negotiating evil cannot be integrated, but must flank evil from two different sides without ever meeting on the field as a single force. Or in Rawls’ language, the concept of something, namely an act being right, cannot solely exist on the basis of rational thought; it requires another element combined with it to achieve its full potency. When the offender is forgiven by the offended as he serves his prison sentence, it absolves the offender of his remorse, and it also shows the public how the overflowing love that is virtual in all human beings can forgive the inexcusable. For evil can be inexcusable, in that no amount of rational intellection can give justification for an act, but nonetheless forgivable (Jankélévitch, Forgiveness 106). Forgiveness, as the gracious, loving gift of the human heart, is the bastion of hope for the human species that signals we can overcome any trial and any tribulation, no matter the cost it inflicts upon us. So, just as the law can supersede the will of the offended and charge an offender with a crime absent of formal charges by the offended, the offended can forgive, beyond the comprehension of the law, not necessarily in spite of the law, but beyond the rational apperception of the values a people share as they are codified in the law. Where the law and justice are prescriptive and expect in advance how to negotiate evil, forgiveness forgives regardless of the deed, without the need for asking why. Justice is scrupulous and investigative, where forgiveness is spontaneous. Without forgiveness, there is no personal relationship between the offender and offended that overcomes evil and repairs the psycho-temporal rupture. And, without justice, there is no reparation of values, nor a temporal reparation for the public so that they may get on with their normal lives. Conjoining all three equiprimordial moments together, we have ethical evolution which will repair the lives of those affected and those who bore witness, and will allow a people to be more resilient to the evil they have already suffered.

Jankélévitch makes it clear that both the offender and the offended must “consent to becoming and [renounce] the delight of constant repetition [and] [make] fluid the advent of the future and [lubricate] the succession of the before and after” if we are to seal the rupture of the psyche, and allow the offender and offended to get back into the flow of temporal becoming (Forgiveness 21). I take this notion for granted and take it one step further and make it a condition of the institutions of justice to “lubricate the succession of the before and after.” Ethical evolution is not merely a transformation via remorse, forgiveness, and justice. It is a modification of a people, along with the values which they understand the world by, that broadens their horizons of what is right and wrong leading to ethical reparation and ethical resiliency. In the broadening of their horizons, a people are able to imagine possibilities that they could not before, and see those possibilities that were once invisible to them. When the Allies liberated the Nazi death camps, the imagination of the West as to the depth of what human beings were capable of was changed forever. The evil of the Nazis sponsored the ethical evolution of the West to the extent that the Milgram experiments were conducted to study the capacity of the human being to do evil acts. As I have been suggesting, evolution, in the ethical context, implies reparation and resiliency. The subtly between restoration and reparation lies in the temporal facticity of irrevocability and irreversibility. Restoration occurs when a debt is paid back, or when things are made again just as they were before. A computer hard drive can be restored after having been corrupted by a virus; a human being is repaired after having suffered evil. Justice, recognizing it will not be able to give a person her partner back after a
murder, largely attempts to restore a situation to a condition it was in before via punishment and restitution, without the lived duration between the offended and the offender. Without the personal, irrational moments of ethical evolution, justice is a temporally impotent form of reparation that cannot seal the temporal rupture caused by evil on its own. Only through a pure remorse that desires to overcome suffering, and with a pure forgiveness that forgiveness regardless of the deed, and a judicial decision that accords with a people’s values is there a holistic sealing of the temporal rupture caused by evil.

We can analogously think of the difference between reparation and restoration when we consider the Japanese art of “Kintsugi.” Kintsugi is the art of repairing broken pottery with gold lacquer. For example, a broken bowl would be put back together, but not to make it look the same as it did before. The gold lacquer is used to seal the cracks between the pieces, highlighting the imperfections in the piece and acknowledging the fact that it has been broken. In Kintsugi, the imperfections and brokenness of objects are made to be desirable and thought of as distinguished. Kintsugi does not attempt to make the objects the same as they were before, but it rather embraces the brokenness of the object and makes it more beautiful than it was previously. Like Kintsugi, human beings who have suffered evil are not restored to be the same as they were, but are repaired to be better than they were once before. They are transformed from an ordinary existence into one marked by struggle and the beauty of reparation. Reparation makes us better than we were before. We can also consider Nietzsche’s slightly hyperbolic claim in terms of reparation when he says, “that which does not kill us makes us stronger” (The Portable Nietzsche 680).

The virtue of remorse lies in it being the catalyst of ethical evolution, whereby we can always choose to do better in the future, in lieu of being remorseful for past evil deeds. Dewey agrees with Jankélévitch that we learn from making mistakes when he says, “[f]ailure is instructive. The person who really thinks learns quite as much from his failures as from his successes” (Essential Dewey 142). The virtue of forgiveness lies in the gracious gift it gives to the offender to lubricate the potentiality for temporal becoming and sealing the psychic rupture caused by evil, while also contributing to the healing of the temporal rupture. Lastly, the virtue of justice lies in the public bearing witness to evil, and to the best of the public’s ability, repair the lives of those affected by evil with rational insight, helping and encouraging everyone to get on with their regular lives, even though they are forever changed. When confronted with the rupture of our values, it is incumbent upon the representatives of our values to come forward, and to the best of their ability, make sense of evil scrupulously through the law as the institutionalized, linguistic embodiment of our values (Rawls 208). In asking the most of the representatives of our values, we must also ask the most of those offended – to forgive. Lives are affected by evil and this demands a genuine and earnest response by human beings to do their best to confront it with the whole of their being. Lives are taken by evil acts and only through justice and forgiveness
can we repair the lives of people affected by evil so they may get on with their lives as they did once before; but of course, their existences will never be the same. It will never be the same and they will also know how and why they will never be the same. As Jankélévitch says “[reparation] does not give us the joy that preceded this pain” (The Bad Conscience 67). But being repaired does give us the ability to oppose the kind of evil we have already suffered and borne witness to in the future. A people’s resiliency to confront evil is multiplied for having suffered it. This notion is as simple as saying, “fool me once shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.”

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have shown how ethical evolution requires that we suffer the slings and arrows of evil to become ever more resilient to it in the future, and to become ethically better people ourselves through reparation. Jankélévitch sums the entirety of ethical evolution up best when he says, “[a]s long as becoming is a continual creation turned toward the future, it counsels us simply to welcome something else, to think of something else, to open ourselves up to the alterity of the next day” (Forgiveness 21). To suffer and be burnt to ashes is what allows the Phoenix to rise, stronger and more durable than before. In another fitting passage, Jankélévitch says, “pain, although it comes from an impotence, still represents a relative success of life, it is a good sign to be able to suffer” (The Bad Conscience 115). Dewey echoes this sentiment, expressing, “[t]he good man is the man who, no matter how morally unworthy he has been, is moving to become better” (Dewey TED 180). He is right. If we did not suffer, we would have no reason to become better people, nor to face evil in the hopes that we would not have another Holocaust or 9/11. It is on the basis of human suffering that human beings are catalyzed to repair themselves, allowing themselves to be more resilient against evil. Just as in psychotherapy where the analysand can recognize the triggers of a historically conditioned pain, a people who share values, after being subject to the terror of evil, will be able to know that same evil as it creeps upon their horizon. One only builds a castle knowing that they have the potential to be invaded, or that they have been invaded before. As human beings, we will always do, be victims to, and have to confront, evil. Our worlds will be shaken and we will be called upon to answer the challenge of resisting the forces of evil. Through ethical evolution, our scars will heal, we will become stronger against the violence rallied against us, all the while swiftly moving along with the sands of time, never able to remain the same, but continually becoming more excellent for suffering, and having, suffered the ruptures of evil.
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APPLYING MARCUSE TO MODERN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Introduction

Herbert Marcuse has been hailed as the “father” of the New Left for his contributions to progressive social movements in the 1960s. Most notably, Marcuse provided a new framework to analyze how trends within society could both “extend liberty while intensifying domination” (as quoted in Bowring, 2012, 17). Though there is evident pessimism in Marcuse’s earlier works, especially One-Dimensional Man, his later works offer a glimmer of hope concerning the possibilities of radical qualitative change emerging from within the contradictions of society. In this regard, Marcuse’s theory sharply contrasts with his early Frankfurt School colleagues. In particular, Theodor Adorno feared that the instrumentalization and co-optation of critical thinking had developed to such a degree that he limited himself to theoretical resistance (Masquelier, 2014). On the contrary, Marcuse recognized the transformative unity of theory and action, arguing that emancipatory projects must realize their mutual dependence in order to succeed (Farr, 2013, p. 406). Interestingly, even though Marcuse emphasized the need for practice, his influence in social movement theory had largely disappeared by the 1970s. Instead, Jürgen Habermas became one of the primary influences of New Social Movement theory. Though the scope of this paper cannot contrast the merits and limitations of both critical theorists, it must be noted that there is a growing interest within academia to move away from Habermas due to concerns over the increasingly institutionalized nature of radical movements and their co-optation. Consequently, this paper will argue that there is a void in current social movement theory that Marcuse can aptly fill.

The first portion of this paper will discuss the constrained and one-dimensional environment in which progressive social movements must operate. Specifically, I will argue that the false needs and comforts produced by capitalism create an elusive “good life,” rendering any dissent questionable. In terms of politics and media perceptions, I will further argue that liberal democracies only provide a “subdued pluralism,” significantly closing the space in which dissenting voices may break the status quo. However, following Marcuse’s logic, these same constraints also open up a new dimension of negation within the system, as demonstrated by some current social movements. The next portion of this paper will thus argue that Marcuse’s work provides an important backdrop to understand, as well as a critical lens to analyze, modern social movements. Lastly, limitations to Marcuse’s own theory and the possibilities for revolutionary opposition will be addressed.

The “good life”

For Marcuse, the current establishment effectively wields control over individuals by defining and regulating human desires and instincts through the logic of capital. Capitalism need not overtly dominate through typical totalitarian means of repression, but asserts its control by superimposing false needs onto the populace and compelling people to consume the goods that they are provided. Consequently, “social control is anchored in the new need which it has produced” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 9). As a result, people increasingly associate themselves with their material goods (Ibid.). What is most important to the containment of social change is the fact that people internalize these needs as if they were their own, to the extent to which “false consciousness […] becomes the true consciousness” (Ibid., p. 11). In order to continuously gratify these false satisfactions, people are compelled to line up before dawn to get the best deals on Black Friday, purchase the new iPhone, or lease the new Tesla. However, the satisfaction of these “needs” only contributes to a more alienated existence and “euphoria of unhappiness” (Ibid., p. 5). In other words, people may achieve a quantitative sense of happiness in their material possessions but they are “qualitatively impoverished” (Depuis-Déri, 2013, p. 534). It remains clear that consumption in an affluent society is not necessarily associated with increases in reported happiness and well-being, but is rather more akin to temporary gratification (Bowring, 2012). As a result, “[t]he better and bigger satisfaction is very real, and yet, in Freudian terms it is repressive inasmuch as it diminishes in the individual psyche the sources of the pleasure principle and of freedom” (Marcuse as quoted in Bowring).
Moreover, the logic of market-oriented, neoliberal policies is based on the “model of utility-oriented calculation” or the “performance principle,” subsequently preventing individuals from realizing themselves as both sensuous and cognitive beings capable of a creative and authentic life outside of the logic of capital (Masquelier, 2013, p. 401; Winters, 2013, p. 157). In short, the performance principle generated by capitalism has fully become the reality principle for everyday life.

The false needs administered by society ultimately lead to a false sense of freedom. So long as people are able to attain some of the material comforts of the “good life,” then there is no need to expect anything more than what is provided. Through its method of production “society takes care of the need for liberation by satisfying the need which makes servitude palatable and perhaps even unnoticeable” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 24). Liberation becomes doubtful since it would also entail liberation “from that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable” (Ibid., p. 7). In this respect, Marcuse is particularly critical of the logic behind the welfare state (at least in capitalist societies), as it provides comforts while simultaneously reducing “the use-value of freedom” so that “there is no reason to insist on self-determination if the administered life is the comfortable and even the “good” life” (Ibid., p. 49). Therefore, as society is increasingly able to satisfy these needs, the critical functions of thought, autonomy, and the right to political opposition have decreased (Ibid., p. 1).

Even Marx’s revolutionary proletariat has been co-opted by the comforts of the current system. As a result, Marcuse rejects the revolutionary potential of the working class, as modern workers now have vested interests in the success of business and are further pacified by work benefits and comfortable union benefits (Ibid., pp. 26-30). Consequently, Marcuse maintains that the working class is the “[r]evolutionary class ‘in-itself’ but not ‘for itself,’ objectively but not subjectively” (Marcuse, 1969, p. 59). In other words, though the working class may occupy a critical area in production, it does not have the radical subjectivity to be the revolutionary class. Since Marcuse could no longer rely on the working class as the prime actors in an emancipatory project, he instead turned to the outcasts and minorities of society (Marcuse, 2013, p. 488). However, it should also be noted that Marcuse wrote One-Dimensional Man during a time of particular affluence and today the threads holding together the “good life” have arguably begun to unravel. In other words, the “good life” Marcuse outlined in the 1960s is now marked by insecurity, decreasing wages, debt, and political disorganization (Froman, 2013, p. 516). Therefore, there is some cynicism present in our one-dimensional consciousness. Marcuse was not unaware of this obvious contradiction within capitalism.

In Counterrevolution and Revolt, Marcuse recognizes that capitalism is increasingly producing false needs that it cannot fulfill (Kellner, 1983, p. 71). Thus, the image of the “good life” continues to be propagated to all as the norm, despite the inability of the vast majority of people to meet this standard of living. If the rising expectations are not met, it can result in revolt, as people lash out against structural unemployment, structural misrecognition, or structural inequality. In dialectical fashion, the contradictions of capitalist society have “opened a new dimension, which is at one and the same time the living space of capitalism and its negation” (Marcuse, 1972, p. 19). It is evident that capitalism cannot fully succeed in its containment strategy, as its inherent contradictions will result in social unrest that crack the walls of one-dimensional thought. Consequently, especially in his later works, Marcuse remained hesitantly optimistic that the structural contradictions of capitalist society would generate “transcending needs” that would seek to fulfill desires beyond the repressive system (Kellner, 1983, p. 71). In this light, Marcuse arguably anticipated the current social unrest in many developed countries, as groups seek political space in negation to the current order.

Nonetheless, the important point remains that there are no clear and viable alternatives offered outside of the operations of the current system, making any true revolutionary project questionable (Froman, 2013, p. 518). The current reality thus mobilizes against any alternative, and “the status quo defies transcendence” (Marcuse, 1991, p. 17). Therefore, the viability of current social movements continues to be a very pressing question. Furthermore, the containment strategy is not only limited to the one-dimensional
logic of capitalism by itself, but is further enforced by the operational logic of modern liberal politics.

One-Dimensional Politics

For Marcuse, our current way of thinking is fundamentally operational, meaning that all ideals are reduced to a set of operations that can be quantified. Within this paradigm, instrumental politics have emerged. Political action is limited to what can be operationalized within the current system, while anything qualitatively different is dismissed as nonsense. Consequently, utopian thought has been banished, and we are left only with one-dimensional thought that seeks to enforce compliance with the status quo (Marcuse, 1991, p. 13). In this regard, it is evident that Marcuse was able to anticipate and effectively critique the “subdued pluralism” propagated by liberal theorists, most notably John Rawls (Ibid., p. 13). According to Rawls, political liberalism is the only means to establish an overlapping consensus regarding our basic institutional structures in a society that is marked by competing visions of the good life (2005). As a result, it is necessary to establish a public sphere regulated by the principles of fairness and justice that are acceptable to all “reasonable” beings (Ibid., p. 134). Any ideas or practices that are incompatible with the basic principles of liberalism and reason are banished to the private sphere.

By insisting on consensus and public reason, liberalism effectively works to “domesticate” and dismiss more radical visions on what constitutes the political life, in order to remove possible dissent (Winters, 2013, p. 164). In the end, many troublesome concepts are taken off the board because they are incompatible with the rational terms of operation instituted by the current system (Marcuse, 1991, p. 13). Moreover, one-dimensional thought is systematically promoted by liberal politics through its “hypnotic definitions and dictions,” so that freedom can only be thought of in terms of free institutions and free enterprise, while socialism is immediately perceived as an encroachment of private property (Ibid., p. 14).

Furthermore, under a system wherein only the most powerful have a reliable say, “[t]he reality of pluralism becomes ideological and deceptive. It seems to extend rather than reduce manipulation and coordination, to promote rather than counteract the fateful integration” (Ibid., p. 41). Therefore, though political and civil rights, such as the freedom of speech, freedom of association, the right to vote, and fair elections, are upheld as quintessentially democratic, these rights “in a society of total administration serve to strengthen this administration by testifying to the existence of democratic liberties which in reality, have changed their content and lost their effectiveness” (Marcuse, 1965, p. 84). In other words, though the underlying assumption promoted by society is one of freedom, in reality, free and equal discussion becomes unachievable in a system of unequal powers (Ibid., p. 93). Any changes in society will be accordingly limited to the particular interests of those in control who benefit from maintaining the status quo. Though minority and outcast groups may be free to discuss and deliberate on their own, any dissent will be swallowed up by “the overwhelming majority, which militates against qualitative social change” (Ibid., p. 94). Liberalism thus reduces the avenues whereby diverging opinions can enter the political realm, ultimately neutralizing politics and limiting political discussion to the ideas and words of the establishment (Ibid., p. 96).

As a result, cohesion in this system is not truly based on a plurality of views but is rather based on the opposition to a permanent enemy (Marcuse, 1991, p. 51). In Marcuse’s time, the enemy was conveniently found in communist states and today this enemy has largely become terrorism, most obviously Islamic fundamentalism. Anti-Islamic rhetoric has become commonplace in political dialogue to promote national interests, whether it be Donald Trump’s anti-immigration campaign, former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s proposed barbaric cultural practices act, or former American President Bush’s “war on terror.” Especially since 2001, the war on terror rhetoric, promoted by many western states, has been used as a means to establish cohesion between public opinion and increased surveillance (Forman, 2013, p. 519). The benefits of the welfare state are thus constantly paired with the increased surveillance of private lives, leading to “a potent mix of institutional reform and brutal repression” (Schlembach, 2015, p. 992). In the Canadian
context, Bill C-51 demonstrates how governments can effectively wield the fear of a common enemy in order to curtail the liberties that they are, in theory, supposed to protect. In reality, Bill C-51 places a major constraint on “advocacy, protest, and dissent activities” that are perceived as “unlawful,” meaning that demonstrators, who do not hold an official permit or continue protesting despite court orders, could be shut down as a “terrorism offence” (Amnesty International, 2015). Consequently, dissenting voices and actions are readily collapsed into a single category and denounced as illegitimate or even as terrorism.

The one-dimensional paradigm upheld by formal politics is further reinforced by media and public perceptions. For example, the 2012 student protests in Quebec were largely condemned as “terrorism” by several news reports, as well as local politicians (Depuis Déri, 2013, pp. 537-538). The student protests were in response to tuition hikes proposed by the Quebec government. The student protesters engaged in such retaliatory actions as painting government buildings red, organizing street theater and holding rallies, as well as more forceful demonstrations (Lagalisse, 2012, p. 59). Subsequently, the Quebec government put forth an emergency law. Bill 78, popularly referred to as the “Truncheon Law,” criminalized any unauthorized gatherings of more than fifty people (Ibid.). Following the law’s inception, serious charges were laid against the protestors for actions such as throwing banner sticks, pushing police barriers, or other unruly behavior. In all, the police made over 3500 arrests, engaging in violent counter-action to subdue the protestors (Ibid.). Of those found guilty, custodial sentences ranged from six to thirty-two months (Ibid.). Consequently, it is clear that the rhetoric of the establishment is able to contain dissent by distinguishing between what is legitimate and illegitimate action. On this point, Marcuse asserts that “the traditional distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence becomes questionable,” and if police violence is inherently legitimate and student violence is illegitimate, then it is obvious that “[t]he established vocabulary discriminates a priori against the opposition – it protects the Establishment” (Marcuse, 1969, pp. 76-77). In this light, it is evident that public and media perceptions of protests remain largely one-dimensional, effectively branding defiant action as fundamentally illegitimate.

The social constraints maintained through capitalism and liberalism make subversive social action questionable, specifically in regard to progressive social movements. However, despite the apparent pessimism in One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse was dedicated to pairing critical theory with practice in order to discover new subjectivities and orchestrate dissenting views into political action. Marcuse’s work thus provides an important backdrop to understand, as well as a critical lens to analyze, modern social movements. The next section of this paper will outline how Marcuse’s theory is relevant to such movements.

Breaking One-Dimensional Thought?

In An Essay on Liberation, Marcuse asserts that our current state of voluntary servitude “can be broken only through a political practice which reaches the roots of containment and contentment in the infrastructure of man, a political practice of methodological disengagement from and refusal of the Establishment, aiming at a radical transvaluation of values” (1969, p. 6). The liberation from false needs, therefore, entails the refusal of the whole system. In order to generate substantial change, Marcuse argues that we need a “qualitatively different totality,” and social liberation does not only involve the economic sphere but the “totality of human existence” (1972, p. 3; 74). In order to attain this quality of life, Marcuse holds onto “the possibility of emancipated subjectivity” (Holman, 2013, p. 633). As a result, liberation requires a new political logic or, in Marcuse’s words, a “new sensibility,” in order to experience the world differently (1969, p. 23). Without this utopian vision, social movements may run the risk of being just as vacuous as the “one-dimensional society” in which they are protesting (Langman, 2013, p. 516).

Marcuse thus rejects traditional forms of protests and lobbying, as such “rational” behavior can quickly turn to “reasonable submissiveness” (Schlembach, 2015, p. 994). On the contrary, Marcuse argues that social movements must break from the traditional
forms of politics so that they are not co-opted as instruments of the state (Holman, 2013, p. 642). Following Marcuse, Pleyers defines the logic of current movements as “the way of subjectivity,” organized “[a]gainst the commodification of culture, pleasure and experience” (as quoted in Masquelier, 2013, p. 400). Therefore, it is necessary to create a new reality principle independent of the current performance principle that dominates daily lives (Langman, 2013, p. 520). In this light, it is obvious that social movements are not only aimed against corporate greed, economic inequality, or unjust material distribution, but are a larger outcry against the totality of the current system and the subjectivities it has imposed. In this vein, the next portion of this paper will apply Marcuse to the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement and highlight both their correlations and their respective limitations.

**OWS Case-Study**

OWS demonstrates how progressive social movements oppose the status quo upheld by liberal capitalism. According to Langman, the Occupiers’ objectives were aimed at establishing new identities beyond the logic of capital, in order to obtain “seemingly more moral kinds of emotional gratifications to attain the “good life” (Ibid.). Furthermore, OWS recognized the ineffective and contradictory nature of the current parliamentary system, questioning the legitimacy of the representative system (Vey, 2016, p. 64). Consequently, it did not make sense to use conventional means of protest to demand changes.

On the contrary, the Occupiers refused to make any demands of parliament, the government, or the state, as such action would only reinforce the very system that they were lashing out against (Ibid.). The Occupiers not only criticized society but also orchestrated a democratically organized, egalitarian community within Zuccotti Park in direct negation to the established hierarchical and undemocratic political order (Langman, 2013, p. 518). In this regard, the Occupiers not only envisioned a utopian alternative but also implemented it, becoming a lived negation of the status quo. Though there were obvious benefits to OWS’s commitment to direct action within the everyday life of the camp communities, it was unable to target the structural basis of capitalism in a meaningful way and ultimately had no lasting effect (Vey, 2016, p. 64).

OWS’s limited effect may be in part accounted for by its anarchistic tendencies. Anarchism, unlike Marxism, is not aimed at seizing state power but is more concerned with delegitimizing the state or government in order to win back autonomy (Vey, 2016, p. 65). By failing to engage in the current system, OWS failed to acknowledge the real power of the state. In this regard, Blackledge argues that even if social movements are able to provide an alternative to the status quo, states will always be one step ahead, ready to intervene in order to suppress any substantial change (Ibid., p. 66). On the contrary, Marxists recognize the need to produce a counter-hegemonic force in order to fundamentally change the rules of the game and abolish capitalism so that it can no longer reproduce repressive relations (Ibid.). Therefore, it is clear that movements cannot only be inward looking but must eventually face the power of the state. Forman notes that this issue is also a weakness in Marcuse’s own work, as the rejection of formal leadership and organization ultimately makes social movements vulnerable to isolation (2013, pp. 526-527). Though the Occupiers established alter-political methods to avoid co-optation, the lack of organization ultimately made the movement vulnerable to this same threat.

For example, political elites incorporated some of the demands of the movement into the electoral agenda to serve their own ends, without any formal recognition or engagement with the movement itself (Ibid., p. 527).

Though Forman correlates this weakness with Marcuse’s own work, it should be noted that Marcuse did recognize the need for social movements to proliferate outside of their own sphere of influence. On the topic of the student movements fifty years ago, Marcuse asserted that “[i]f the student opposition remains isolated and does not succeed in breaking out of its own limited sphere, if it does not succeed in mobilizing social strata that really will play a decisive role […]” then it “can only play an accessory role” (as quoted in Marcuse, 2013, p. 489). Arguably, Marcuse would similarly claim that OWS simply did not go far enough in establishing and mobilizing a truly revolutionary force. Furthermore, the movement
may not have had the theoretical backing to understand and exploit the structural basis of capitalism, and was therefore, unable to articulate a coherent narrative to be a real threat (Froman, 2013, p. 526). Nonetheless, the question over what constitutes a revolutionary force remains an unresolved tension within Marcuse’s work itself.

**Qualitative Change Without a Revolutionary Subject?**

As previously discussed, Marcuse was forced to dismiss the working class as the revolutionary vanguard. Instead, he turned to marginalized groups that had not yet been fully integrated within the establishment. Nonetheless, the fact remains that radical student groups, Occupiers, ethnic minorities, or other marginalized groups, “do not occupy a decisive place in the productive process and for this reason cannot be considered revolutionary forces from the viewpoint of Marxian theory – at least not without allies” (Marcuse, as quoted in Marcuse, 2013, p. 485). In other words, though such groups can be considered radical, and their actions may be subversive, they cannot be considered revolutionary subjects on their own. None of the oppositional forces in modern society have the “mass basis” to be the revolutionary group on which Marcuse could rely (Marcuse, 2013, p. 489). As a result, the pressing question remains whether qualitative change is possible without this vanguard force. However, be this as it may, to use Marcuse’s own words, even if qualitative change cannot rely on the leadership of a revolutionary class, the presence of radical groups today still offers “a ferment of hope,” as “it testifies to the truth of the alternative – the real need, and the real possibility of a free society” (1969, p. 60). Therefore, though current social movements may have yet to realize any truly revolutionary potential, they do attest to the evident cracks within one-dimensional society.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this paper was to apply Marcuse’s critical thought to modern social movements. In this regard, it was argued that Marcuse offers a critical lens to analyze the constrained environment in which social movements must operate. It is evident that the one-dimensional thought propagated by liberal capitalism severely limits the space for dissenting views. Capitalism, in particular, imposes false needs onto society, which are geared to the logic of capital and material consumption. So long as these needs are satisfied, people are left with a false sense of freedom. Consequently, dissent is questionable, as it would require the revocation of the comforts provided for by the “good life.” Liberalism further enforces a one-dimensional paradigm of operational politics, so that any thoughts and actions deemed incompatible with the system are subsequently banished from the political sphere. As a result, dissenting voices and actions are readily denounced as illegitimate or even as terrorism. However, despite his obvious pessimism, Marcuse was still committed to pairing theory with practice in order to generate revolutionary potential. Such potential is notable in several of the social movements that have surfaced within the twenty-first century. Within this scope, it was argued that OWS had several correlations with Marcusian thought, as the Occupiers sought to create new subjectivities in negation to the current order. However, it was further argued that OWS’s strategy failed to attack the structural basis of capitalism and consequently had no lasting impact. As a result, Marcuse would arguably acknowledge the Occupiers’ efforts but would further recognize that OWS failed to mobilize a revolutionary force. On this front, the composition of a revolutionary force remains a point of tension within Marcuse’s work itself. Ultimately, Marcuse was never able to find an oppositional force with the necessary mass basis to serve such ends. Though social movements like OWS have yet to exploit the revolutionary potential present in the contradictions of society, they nonetheless speak to a growing social unrest, which serves to crack the paradigm of one-dimensional thought. Consequently, though the real impact of social movements must be weighed with a suitable amount of reserve, the potential for qualitative change need not be completely hopeless.
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YOUTH AND ILLICIT DRUG REPRESENTATIONS IN CANADIAN PRINT MEDIA
Literature Review

The vast majority of literature on illicit drugs and the media does not comment, at length, on the representation of youth. However, there is some literature that focuses on the representation of youth in the media, outside the realm of illicit drugs. For instance, Faucher (2009) qualitatively examined the representation of youth offenders in the Canadian print media from 1900-2000. The most dominant narrative present in Faucher’s study is that youth offenders are violent and to be feared by society. Bernier (2011) reviewed two Californian newspapers over a three-month time-period. Similar to Faucher (2009), the overall representation in these two newspapers was negative, with youth being portrayed as “troubled, troubling, and dangerous” (Bernier, 2011, p.158). In another study, Levinsen and Wein (2010) quantitatively examined the representation of youth in Danish newspaper articles over a fifty-year period, between 1953 and 2003. Overall, youth were portrayed with an emphasis on accidents and crime, but representations of youth remained more neutral than negative.

In addition to the literature on youth and the media, there are many existing studies on the representation of illicit drugs in the print media, and on the representation of drugs in the media overall. This literature was reviewed to create a model and context for my research.

Haines-Saah et al. (2014) use content analysis to examine the predominant themes in Canadian mainstream news media about marijuana, from the years 1997-2007. The authors found that marijuana is part of a “privileged normalization” (p. 47) discourse, where marijuana use is socially accepted for some privileged social groups (such as celebrities or athletes), but not for groups that are marginalized and lack power. Despite marijuana being normalized in most of the newspaper discourse, articles about drug use, youth, non-whites, and females were linked to deviant and negative representations.

Manning (2006) examines the symbolic frameworks which organize the representation of illicit drug use and abuse in UK national newspapers by comparing newsprint portrayals of volatile substance abuse (VSA) and ecstasy from 1993-2001. Manning found that negative representations of ecstasy were overrepresented in newspaper reports, whereas VSA was underrepresented. Manning points out that VSA users are constructed as the marginalized other, such as the homeless; whereas ecstasy use is symbolically framed in the media as a “threat to the innocent” that harms youth (2006, p. 60). There is much more concern over vulnerable youth using ecstasy, and little concern over the marginalized people who engage in VSA use, even though it is much more dangerous.

Boyd’s (2002) article examines how media constructs illegal drugs, as well as those who use and sell them. Boyd examines the UK TV series Traffic and the American movie Traffic through the lens of race, class, and gender issues. Boyd found that representations of drug use and drug selling are portrayed as being more common and more violent than in real life. Youths, especially females, were often portrayed as victims of drug related crimes, such as drug gang related violence.

Lastly, Lilja (2013) uses categorical-content narrative analysis to examine the construction of youth drug use in Russia. Lilja found that young people were frequently the subject of articles about drug users. There was much panic in the articles about the “loss of a generation” of young people from drugs, or that young people would be “destroyed” by drugs (Lilja 2013, p. 1340). Similar to the other studies, Lilja (2013) suggests that drug use representations in the media are based in fear and sensationalization and not objective facts (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Bernier, 2011; Faucher, 2009; Manning, 2006; Boyd, 2002). Despite the shifting legal and geographical contexts, illicit drugs are misrepresented all over the globe.

After reviewing the literature, there is a clear gap in the current research. The first gap is that all the literature examined the media before 2007, whereas this study examines more contemporary print news media from 2006 to 2015. Secondly, most of the existing literature is international, and given the
differences in drug policy world-wide, more Canadian research is needed. Finally, existing research lacks a focus on youth in the context of illegal drugs and the media. Few studies examining illicit drug representation in the media also discussed the representation of youth. Moreover, studies focused specifically on the representation of youth and illegal drugs in the media did not emerge in the literature searches. This leaves an obvious gap in research about the representation of youth and illicit drugs in the Canadian media.

**Theoretical Foundations**

This research draws on Manning’s (2006) symbolic framing theory, which is premised on the notion that depictions of illicit drugs are constructed in the media through symbolic meanings and representations (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Manning, 2006). These meanings and representations are based in pre-existing social and historical inequalities. Therefore, drugs and their users are represented in symbolic framework “based on the social location of it’s users” (Haines-Saah et al, 2014, p. 50). Accordingly, symbolic framing relates to this study as youth are a marginalized and vulnerable group who are often depicted negatively in the media (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Lilja, 2013; Bernier, 2011; Faucher, 2009; Manning, 2006; Boyd, 2002). The negative representation by the media in terms of youth crime and illicit drugs may be explained by the social location of youth as a historically vulnerable and marginalized group (Offerdahl, Evangelides, and Powers, 2014).

Manning (2006) reviewed literature to discover the main symbolic frames before examining UK media representations. It was upon this literature that he drew his theoretical conclusions about the symbolic frames he would explore. Similarly, this research will focus on the existence of five possible symbolic frames, selected from common themes in the existing literature on youth or illicit drugs in the media (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Lilja, 2013; Bernier, 2011; Faucher, 2009; Manning, 2006; Boyd, 2002). The five frames include: (1) overall tone; (2) violence; (3) involvement with gangs; (4) drug use; and (5) drug dealing.

Below, are the hypotheses and variables explored for each symbolic frame:

1. **Youth and Overall Tone of Framing:** Articles mentioning youth will be more likely to be negative than articles that do not mention youth.

2. **Youth and Violence:** Articles mentioning youth will be more likely to mention violence than articles that do not mention youth.

3. **Youth and Gangs:** Articles mentioning youth will be more likely to mention gang involvement than articles that do not mention youth.

4. **Youth and Illicit Drug Use:** Articles mentioning youth will be more likely to mention illicit drug use than articles that do not mention youth.

5. **Youth and Illicit Drug Dealing:** Articles including youth will be more likely to mention illicit drug dealing than articles which do not mention youth.

**Data and Methods**

This analysis is a part of an exploratory study probing the representation of illicit drugs in the Canadian print media from the years 2006-2015. In total, 349 online print media articles were randomly selected from 20 local, provincial, and national newspapers. News articles were coded to discern the frequency of common symbolic frames found in the literature. Each variable explores a different symbolic frame, which may represent youth and illicit drugs in the print media.
Randomly Selecting the Newspaper Articles

To ensure that the articles selected for inclusion in this sample were publicly accessible, Google advanced search was used to find each article. Using the advanced search tools, keyword searches for “drug” and “drugs” were conducted only on the website of specific newspapers that were randomly selected. A random number generator (random.org) was used to select each article from the search results. This way, all articles had an equal chance of being selected. After the first article was selected, the same process was repeated to randomly select another article. If the article was in the 2006-2015 time-frame, and met the other search criteria related to illicit drugs, it was included in the final sample. Some prescription drugs and legal drugs may be included in the articles, but only if the use of the prescription drug or legal drug was illegal (such as selling of prescription, or use by a minor). This process was repeated until there were two articles from each year, and from each selected publication.

The types of newspaper articles included in the sample were: opinion pieces, editorials, letters to the editor, and articles reporting local, national, or international news articles. Classifieds or advertisements were omitted from the sample. Table 1 provides a listing of all the newspapers used for the analyses.

Table 1. Newspapers selected online by region and level of coverage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers Selected by region*</th>
<th>Local, provincial, or national coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Post</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Globe and Mail</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pincher Creek Echo</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Community Press</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Aurora</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunatsiaq Online</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa Sun</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times Columnist</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Edmonton</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader-Post</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg Free Press</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Toronto</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal Gazette</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Telegraph &amp; Sackville Tribune</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Telegram</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Burnside News</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Yellowknifer</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunavut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunavut News North</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There were no freely available newspapers for Yukon Territory
After the articles were selected, each one was thoroughly read, summarized and coded. Key words or phrases in the article, as well as different types of drugs, were coded and entered as variables in SPSS. For this study, several additional variables were created including youth involvement, overall tone/frame, mention of violence, gender, illicit drug dealing, gang involvement, and illicit drug use. Table 2 provides an overview of the basic frequencies and percentages of the variables used in this paper. This table represents the entire sample.

Next, the variables were examined descriptively by running frequencies and testing several bivariate associations with youth involvement. Using SPSS, cross-tabulations and Chi-Square statistics were calculated and interpreted to discover how the Canadian print media tends to represent youth and illicit drugs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency (n=349)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Involvement with Drugs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tone of Framing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illicit Drug Use</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drug Dealing Mentioned</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gang Involvement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Independent Variable

Frequencies and percentages for the independent and dependent measures are reported in Table 2. The following provides a descriptive overview of the operationalization of each measure used in the analysis.

Youth Involvement
The variable “youth involvement” was operationalized to measure if youth were involved in the article or not, pertaining to the subject of illicit drug use. Youth involvement was indicated as “Yes” only if the youth in the article were involved directly with drugs, or with a drug user. Articles that did not discuss youth and drugs were categorized as “No”. Articles were also included if they expressed fear over youths engaging in drug use, or the article discussed how drug users had harmed or targeted children. In total, 16.3% of the articles mentioned youth, and 83.7% of the articles did not.

Dependent Variables

Tone of Framing
This variable was created to discern if the overall framing of the article was negative, neutral, or positive. To account for researcher bias, justification for each article was recorded. Specifically, if the article used unflattering language to describe the drug use or person using the drug, it was classified as negative. Articles which endorsed punitive measures for drug use were classified as negative. Articles which described the dangers of drugs based on moral panic or moral objection, were classified as negative. Out of 349 articles, 188 were classified as negative, or 53.9%.

Articles classified as neutral were those that reported the information and did not present a negative or positive bias to the subject matter. Those which presented two sides to a drug issue were classified as neutral. Also, articles which discussed drug harms based on scientific fact and evidence, were classified as neutral. Of all the articles, 146 out of 349 were neutral, or 41.8% of the articles.

Articles which portrayed illicit drugs or illicit drug use in a positive or light-hearted manner, were classified as positive. Articles which supported legalization or harm reduction models, were classified as positive. For all articles, only 15 out of 349 were classified as positive, representing 4.3% percent of the articles.

Gender
The variable for gender was classified by the gender of the person who is portrayed in the article as a drug user or a drug dealer. Gender was not classified by the author of the article. If the person portrayed was female, the article was classified as “female”, and if the person portrayed was male, they were classified as “male”. If drug users or dealers of both genders were mentioned, or if gender was not specific or not applicable, it was classified as “other”. Exclusively, females were underrepresented covering only 5.4% of the articles, whereas 47.9% of the articles discussed males, and 46.7% of the articles discussed “other”.

Violence
The violence variable was created to discern if the article mentions violence in any way. Articles including reports of suicide, murder, shootings, assaults, sexual assaults, or those that expressed fear over any type of violence or danger were classified as “yes”. Articles that did not discuss violence or any fear of violence were classified as “no”. In total, 68.2% or 238 of the articles did not mention violence. The remaining 31.8% or 111 of the articles, mentioned violence or the fear of violence.

Illicit Drug Use
This variable measured if illicit drug use was mentioned or discussed in the article. An article was classified as “yes” if drug use was discussed explicitly, if the article discussed legalizing recreational drug use, if the article discussed someone being arrested and charged with possession, or if the article discusses the drug use of any person. Some articles were classified as both drug use and drug dealing, if both were present. If someone was charged with simple possession of drugs, this was classified as drug use. Articles which discussed the public intoxication of someone on illicit drugs was also classified as drug use. There were 155 articles (44.4%) that referred to drug use, whereas 194 articles (55.6%) did not.
Illicit Drug Dealing
This variable measures if the article refers to drug dealing or trafficking. An article was categorized as referring to drug dealing if: the article discusses police arresting and charging people for drug trafficking; police bust of a marijuana grow operation or home drug lab; fear or worry expressed about drug trafficking; and anything else where drug dealing and trafficking is mentioned. Most articles, 70.8% referred to drug dealing, and 29.2% of articles did not refer to drug dealing.

Gang Involvement
The variable for gang involvement measures if gangs are referred to in an article. Articles in which gangs are discussed were indicated as “yes”, and articles in which gangs were not discussed were indicated as “no”. For the purposes of this study, a specific definition of gangs was not used, but rather, if the article used the word “gang” or mentioned gangs in anyway (such as by the name of a gang like Hell’s Angels), it was included in the “yes” category. Approximately 73%, or 255 articles, did not refer to gang involvement.

Results
The results from the cross-tabulations are presented in Table 3, while the bivariate associations are reported in Table 4. Both tables appear at the end of the results section.

Youth and Tone of Framing
The Chi-Square tabulations reveal a statistically significant correlation between youth involvement and tone of framing, at p=0.005. When youth are mentioned, the tone of the articles was overwhelmingly negative. In total, 70.2% of the articles mentioning youth were negative. Only 7% of the articles that mentioned youth were positive, and the remaining 22.8% of the articles were neutral in tone. In comparison, 50.7% of the articles that did not mention youth were negative in tone. To further contextualize these results, the frequency tables for tone revealed that only 53.9% of the entire sample was negative in tone, 41.8% of the sample was neutral in tone, and 4.3% of the sample was positive (refer to Table 2 for results for the entire sample). Therefore, my hypothesis was proven correct: articles mentioning youth in Canadian print media are more likely to utilize a negative tone.

Youth and Gender
Youth involvement with drugs was also statistically significant, with an alpha value of p=0.001. Out of articles that mentioned youth, 14% discussed females, 31.6% discussed males, and the majority, 54.4%, fell into the “other” category. In articles that did not discuss youth, only 3.8% of the articles discussed females, 51% discussed males, and 45.2% fell into “other”. This indicates that female representation is slightly higher for articles which discussed youth. The “other” category is higher for youth articles, whereas the male category is lower for the youth articles than non-youth articles. Articles which mentioned “other” gender were the most likely to be represented in articles about youth. This finding may be because there are restrictions in Canadian media about reporting on youth crimes, so any identifying information, such as gender, is usually suppressed or presented in a way that readers cannot easily identify youth involved in crime.

Youth and Violence
The association between youth involvement and violence is not statistically significant (p=0.372). When youth were mentioned in the story, only 36.8% of the articles also mentioned violence. Out of the articles that did not refer to youth, 30.8% mentioned violence. This is slightly higher than the presence of violence in all the articles overall, which was at 31.8%. This indicates that there is a slight increase in articles which mention both youth and violence. However, this difference did not prove to be statistically significant. My hypothesis was proven incorrect, violence was not more likely to be portrayed with youth involvement, despite a slight increase in the cross-tabulation percentages.

Youth and Drug Use
Chi-Square tabulations for youth involvement and drug use were statistically significant at p=0.000. In total, 77.2% of articles involving youth also discuss drug use. Only 38% of the articles which do not discuss youth, mention drug use. Additionally, the frequency for all articles which discussed drug use for the entire sample was 44.4%. This indicates that
articles which discuss youth were much more likely to discuss drug use than articles that did not discuss youth. My hypothesis was correct, as drug use is more likely to be discussed when youth are mentioned in the article.

**Youth and Drug Dealing**

When interpreting the Chi-Square tabulations, the relationship between youth involvement with drugs and drug dealing were statistically significant at \( p=0.000 \). In total, 50.9% of the articles mentioning youth also mentioned drug dealing, whereas 49.1% of the articles discussing youth did not. Comparatively, 74.7% of the articles that do not discuss youth mentioned drug dealing, with only 25.3% of the articles not discussing youth or drug dealing. The entire sample considered, 70.8% of the articles mentioned drug dealing. In this context, articles which discuss youth, are less likely to mention drug dealing. My hypothesis was incorrect, articles that did not mention youth appear to be more likely to mention drug dealing, than articles that involve youth.

**Youth and Gangs**

In this sample, there is no statistically significant association between youth involvement and gang involvement (\( p=0.155 \)). In 80.7% of the articles which included youth, gangs were not mentioned. Conversely, 19.3% of the articles mentioning youth also mentioned gangs. Gangs were mentioned less frequently alongside youth than the results for gang involvement for all articles in the sample, where 73.1% of articles did not mention gangs. My hypothesis was not correct, as the cross-tabulations suggest, youth involvement is less likely to be framed with gang involvement; moreover, the association is not significant statistically.

**Table 3. Descriptive frequencies and percentages for different measures by youth involvement in media representations of illegal drugs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency (n=349)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth (Y)</td>
<td>Youth (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tone of Framing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence Mentioned</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illicit Drug Use</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drug Dealing Mentioned</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gang Involvement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Bivariate statistics for youth involvement in media representations of drugs in the media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson Chi-Square</th>
<th>Degrees of freedom</th>
<th>P-value/Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth and tone</td>
<td>10.431</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and gender</td>
<td>13.866</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and violence</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and drug use</td>
<td>29.653</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and drug dealing</td>
<td>13.038</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and gang involved</td>
<td>2.018</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at p<0.05

Discussion

The most significant finding is that youth in news articles concerning illicit drugs are more likely to be framed in a negative tone. The overall negative tone confirms the work of Haines-Saah et al. (2014), Lilja (2013), Faucher (2009), Manning (2006), and Boyd (2002). This is significant in the context of this study, as it suggests the overall symbolic frame for articles discussing youth is negative, which may impact the public’s perception of youth and drugs more generally. Yet, youth articles are not as serious in terms of violence, drug dealing, and gang involvement.

As explained by symbolic framing theory, this may be due to the vulnerable and low social location of youth in society (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Manning, 2006). Since youth are a vulnerable and marginalized population, the media creates more negativity surrounding their drug use and drug activity, as opposed to the rest of the population.

Additionally, articles which mentioned youth were more likely to discuss drug use, as opposed to drug dealing, which may be arguably more serious. Applying symbolic framing theory to this finding, it could be suggested that another symbolic frame in regards to youth and illegal drugs is that of drug use. The drug dealing variable provided an interesting contrast to the drug use variable. Youth are not more likely to be mentioned with drug dealing. In fact, youth were more likely not to be discussed in the context of drug dealing. This is illuminating, because it demonstrates that youth may be more likely to be represented as using drugs, but not with dealing illicit drugs.

The extent to which youth drug use was framed as problematic is difficult to tell, based on the quantitative nature of this project. However, when examining the study’s results, discussions of youth were more likely to utilize the symbolic frames of both drug use and negative framing. Together, these results suggest that there may be a negative frame surrounding youth drug use specifically. The symbolic frame of negative youth drug use was also mirrored in much of the literature on this topic (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Lilja, 2013; Manning, 2006; Boyd, 2002). More qualitative analysis is needed to discover the exact nature of negative representations of youth and drug use.

The results testing the relationship between gangs and youth also adds an interesting dimension to the representation of youth and illicit drugs. While youth are symbolically framed negatively overall, they are not framed in terms of more serious forms of drug issues. Youth articles were less likely to be represented alongside gang involvement, as compared to articles which did not mention youth. Additionally, the correlation between youth and violence was not significant. These representations are more accurate portrayals of youth, as most youths who are involved in drug use do not become involved with drug dealing, gangs and violence (Bennetto and Todd, 1997).

The fact that youth were portrayed mostly as drug users and were less likely to be portrayed with gangs, violence, or drug dealing, further points to drug use as a major symbolic frame for youth in this study. From these findings, it appears youth are portrayed more as drug users, and not as those involved in the more serious or violent crimes that are often associated with illicit drugs. In this way, the results suggest that youth...
are being symbolically framed as illicit drug users. This is somewhat contradictory to the vast majority of the literature, which demonstrated that youth drug use was problematized more than non-youths due to their marginalized social location (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Lija, 2013; Bernier, 2011; Faucher, 2009; Manning, 2006; Boyd, 2002). Despite my initial hypotheses being incorrect, realistic framing may be promising for the Canadian media, suggesting that representations are becoming more realistic and less problematic. Qualitative work is needed to further explore the context behind symbolic framing for these initial findings.

The relationship between gender and youth proved to be statistically significant, with articles about youth more likely to discuss females than articles not involving youth, while articles discussing males were seemingly more common for non-youth involved articles. The “other” category proved to be the most relevant for understanding the differences between youth and non-youth articles. The finding that females were more represented and males less represented may be in part explained by Boyd (2002) and Haines-Saah (2014), who found that girls were more likely to be discussed as victims of the war on drugs. The “other” category is difficult to disentangle, as there may have been females and males in these articles. Moreover, it may be a reflection of media restrictions surrounding articles involving youth and crime.

Despite the relationship between youth and gender being statistically significant, there was not an overwhelming large disparity when comparing female representations between articles mentioning youth and articles that do not explicitly mention females. The extent to which the representation of girls was problematic or victimized is unknown, and could be further explored in a qualitative analysis of this data. Since so much of this variable is unexplored, gender is not named as a symbolic frame in the study.

In conclusion, the three most significant symbolic frames demonstrated in this study were: (1) a negative tone which framed the majority of youth articles; (2) youth are symbolically framed as drug users in Canadian print media; and lastly, (3) the symbolic framing of youth was more realistic as compared to other literature, as youth involvement was not associated with violence, gangs, and drug dealing.

Limitations, Future Directions and Conclusion

Since the articles were coded and operationalized by only one researcher, personal bias may affect the classification of the articles. This may influence the determination of tone, and possibly the other variables as well. Attempts were made to limit this bias by justifying the classification for the articles and by using criteria to classify their tone, as outlined in previous sections.

An additional limitation is that only 16.9% of the sample discussed youth drug involvement. This may have been improved by selecting a sample which dealt exclusively with youth. However, by including both articles which do and do not discuss youth, this paper has the advantage of being able to compare the representation of both groups.

In the context of this study specifically, the inclusion of qualitative content analysis to further examine frames would help to support the quantitative results. Although quantitative analysis is helpful for identifying general frequencies and patterns behind the representations, a qualitative analysis may further illuminate the symbolic frames that were discussed in this article.

This study adds to the literature of youth representations in the Canadian print media. As mentioned previously, there is limited existing literature discussing the media’s representation of youth and illicit drugs, in both the international and Canadian contexts. This paper attempts to fill a portion of this gap and begin the conversation about media representations of youth and illicit drugs. More contextual analyses, both quantitative and qualitative, are needed to better understand the relationship between the representation of youths and illicit drugs in the print media. Deconstructing the representation of youth in terms of illicit drugs is important in understanding how the consumers of media may, in turn, view youth.
References


