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A portrait of a young man with short brown hair and glasses, wearing a dark blue button-down shirt with a white star pattern. He is standing in a modern building with large glass windows and a wooden bench in the foreground. The background is slightly blurred, showing an interior space with a white ceiling and structural elements.

AN ACCOUNT OF ETHICAL EVOLUTION

Introduction

In the course of human affairs, individuals, their values, and the political systems by which they establish and engage in cooperative behaviour become violently ruptured by evil that catalyzes their evolution. As the theorizing of principles of right human conduct over time, ethics must account for these ruptures. In this paper, I provide a theory of *ethical evolution* as an authentic response to these ruptures. To do this, I synthesize Vladimir Jankélévitch's irrationalist ethics of *remorse* and *forgiveness* with a politicized, rationalist conception of *reparational justice*, with theoretical guidance from John Dewey and John Rawls. I create a philosophically balanced and potent theory of the ethical evolution of human beings as they increase their *ethical resiliency* and cultivate *ethical reparation* after having experienced evil. Reparation in this context is not simply a restoration and return to a state that was before; it is a holistic movement of thriving becoming, a temporal evolution of a people and their values, for having suffered evil (Daly). I demonstrate how Jankélévitch's penetrating insights into psychological ethics, coupled with Dewey's political justice, is highly profitable for the goal of repairing the lives of those affected by evil, and to prevent and prepare against evil in the future. The purpose of this project is to expose the virtue of suffering and to reconcile the psychological and temporal aspects of Jankélévitch's thought, with a pragmatic and political concern for how human beings respond to the evil that ruptures their worlds.

This paper is composed of two parts. In the first part, I lay out the philosophical importance of this project, along with the basic structure of it. I establish the foundation for the necessity of an ethical theory that can account for the rationality and irrationality, and also the publicness and privateness, of the human condition. Crucially, I highlight the importance of ethical evolution as the holistic temporal structure by which human beings reconfigure their values in response to evil. I show how this is related to a conception of evil that causes symptomatic ruptures of psyche, values, and temporal becoming. Evil evades an absolute definition as it mutates according to time and place. However, we can recognize the symptoms of it in these worldly ruptures. The second and larger part is where I unfold the dynamic structure of ethical evolution and show how it manifests in its two elements of ethical reparation and ethical resiliency. In detail, I describe the tripartite equiprimordial

moments that constitute ethical evolution: 1) the remorse of the offender, 2) the forgiveness of the offended, and 3) the justice of the adjudicator. I make clear how the virtuality of being better people is on the basis that we do suffer, that we do experience evil which ruptures our worlds and challenges our perceptions of what it means to be good people. Agreeing with Jankélévitch, human suffering is a virtue; it is the virtue that reignites the flames of our ethical values, "a prelude to great reforms," so we may become ever more excellent in our own image (*The Bad Conscience* 47). Assuredly, ethical evolution is the temporal structure by which human beings and their values are righteously modified through suffering the mistakes of evil. As Jankélévitch says, "[s]ituations are modified along with the people who are in these situations... forgiveness is very much headed in the direction of evolution, which always forges ahead" (*Forgiveness* 13)

Part One:

The human being is a special creature. We can love and hate with the passionate intensity that leads to self-sacrifice and murder without any other single person fully capturing the intentions and motivations for our acts. Our individual psychological lives are so esoterically coloured that not even our lovers know the extent to which they make the blood flow through our hearts. Nonetheless, we are also creatures that cooperate with one another in attempts to make sense of love and hatred, and the acts that stem from these primal emotions. We come together in common understanding of expectations of behaviour, beliefs and desires; we can sensibly communicate our wants to one another. In Dewey's words we can, "transfer [our] own content of significance," and provide reasonable justifications for one thing in favor over another (*PPSP* 159). Of course, what I am talking about is the inherent distinction between the irrational and the rational, our private idiosyncratic lives and our public lives of routine convention. It is the case that over the course of modernity we have esteemed rationality over irrationality, but as Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder contend, "although both principles are logically exclusive, their opposition is constantly overcome in our lives." (90). Both aspects have their place in human affairs, and one is not bodily, psychologically, or spiritually privileged over the other; they continually intersect in the course of daily living. This being the case, it is imperative that ethics can account for and incorporate these two separate, yet ontologically equal, components of the human condition in its structure.

As human beings, we are all victims to the irreversible passage of time that whisks by in spite of our attempts to grasp at anything firm, unchanging and fixed. Neither in the private mind nor in the public square of the town can we escape temporal becoming. Jankélévitch makes this abundantly clear when he says, "[a]ll is

thus dragged along in the general movement of becoming" (*Forgiveness* 19). The lived experience of the human being is such that scruples of a remorseful person and the rancor of an offended person are anachronistic to temporal becoming, and yet, they can never withstand their revolt against time's infinite authority.¹ As Jankélévitch maintains, "time is almost as omnipotent as death, and time is more tenacious than the most tenacious of wills, for it is irreversible" (*Forgiveness* 16). Taking for granted that the rational-irrational composition of the human being is ultimately incapable of undoing or defying the irreversible flow of time, it also becomes paramount that our ethics espouse the facticity of temporality.

To be perfectly clear, for an ethical system to respect the dualistic nature of the human condition and the temporal facticity of becoming, it is necessary that it have a partitioned space for the irrational-private, and another for the rational-public, all the while accounting for the irreversible futuration of temporal becoming. If not, we do injustice to the total fullness of our being and run the risk of anachronistic preterition, unable to move into the inevitable future to overcome evil and ethically evolve.² Considering the above, I now introduce my conception of evil, and relate it to Jankélévitch's conceptions of remorse and forgiveness. I then expose the limitations of his thought, and incorporate reparational justice into it, in order to compensate for his theoretical shortcomings.

Neither in his work *The Bad Conscience* nor *Forgiveness* does Jankélévitch give an objective definition of what evil is. However, he does say that the psychological phenomenon of remorse indicates that one has committed evil. In other words, the human psyche knows evil when it suffers remorse from having committed evil; it feels the psychological symptom of evil as a rupture, "a rift" of general consciousness (Jankélévitch, *The Bad Conscience* 13). With this, we can securely

say that evil is related to the psychological. If it is related to the psychological, it is certainly related to how the psyche understands, interprets, and evaluates the phenomena encountered in its world. If evil is related to how the psyche understands, interprets, and evaluates its world, it means two things: 1) evil is structurally related to the value-system of a people and its classification of worldly phenomena, and 2) recognizing evil is not only within the purview of the remorseful person, but all of those with a psychological capacity to know their world and what is valuable to that world. Taking these two points for granted, I contend that evil causes a rupture in the values and temporal becoming of a people, just as it causes a rupture in the psyche of the remorseful offender. I further contend that people of shared values can bear witness to evil; they can recognize the rupture of their values and the daily humdrum of their ordinary lives, even though they may not be able to give a concrete name to the cause of the symptoms they bear witness to. This is absolutely the case for the victims of evil.³ Indeed, evil is an elusive demon that evolves alongside our values and it evades our attempts to give it a simple name. What we do know about evil are its symptoms - that it causes a rupture of psyche in the form of remorse, of values shared among a people, and in the temporal becoming of a people.⁴ Evil is an emergent phenomenon of rupturing that must be addressed by alleviating the symptoms that rupture the various aspects of our worlds before we can overcome evil to return to a state of normalcy.

Taking inventory of the first aspect of the psychological, irrational, and private aspects of humanity, Jankélévitch posits the notion that remorse and forgiveness ought to authentically accord with temporality, and avoid the scruples of consolation and obsessive rancor, respectively (*Forgiveness* 21). That is to say, if we are to be truly remorseful and forgiving, we cannot appeal

to intellection, nor export our suffering upon some force of absolution, whether religious or otherwise. It is only by living through the painful experiences in a Bergsonian duration that remorse and forgiveness advance their pure, irrational potency towards overcoming evil.⁵ To Jankélévitch, intellectual consolation and rancor are the forces of preterition which obstruct futurity and the virtuality of evolution and overcoming evil; rancor “resists becoming” (*The Bad Conscience* 15). Indeed, this is the case. Psychologically dwelling upon the past affects the ability of people to overcome evil. They become locked in a past of repetitive hatred and resentment, anxiously awaiting God or some other absolute truth to save them from themselves. Nonetheless, the ruptures of psyche, values, and temporal becoming by evil announces the virtuality of ethical evolution, the beginning of a new and better world. Jankélévitch describes true remorse as, “the greatest virtue of which a wrongdoing soul is capable” (*The Bad Conscience* 140). This is because remorse is the beginning of being able “to do better another time! one can go beyond the misdeed and reach the other side” (*The Bad Conscience* 58). To complement remorse, forgiveness is a spontaneous gift that absolves the remorseful offender of their suffering. It permits the reparation of the psychotemporal rupture that evil causes in the offender. The function of remorse and forgiveness within ethical evolution is not to make sense of evil, it is to live through and overcome it authentically in accord with temporality. The rational dissection and scruples of evil, along with the business of making amends and enforcing restitution, is left to the jurisdiction of justice.

Jankélévitch lacks a theory of the public that bears witness to evil in his account of remorse and forgiveness. He is unable to resolve the issue of the public’s role in dealing with the egregious affronts and ruptures to the values and goods of our world. Speaking practically,

neither remorse nor forgiveness can repay the debts that evil has caused, nor do they attempt to make sense of evil. They are only able to open up the virtuality for evolution through suffering and repair the psycho-temporal rupture caused by evil. If we wish to live in a society where we regain the property lost from a theft, or a sense of security from knowing a murderer is unable to kill again, it is absolutely required that we have an institutionalized system of reparational justice that ensures people can return to some semblance of a life they had before they were wronged, even though they will be changed forever. As Rawls says, “when infractions occur, stabilizing forces should exist that prevent further violations and tend to restore the arrangement” (6). It is imperative that we have an adjudicator, as a representative of the needs and values of the public, to augment the remorse of the offender and forgiveness of the offended (Dewey, *TPP* 146). This system of justice ought to be as objective and rational as humanly possible, concerned with the ethical and political values of the public, not the psychological and irrational. Jankélévitch makes it clear that justice has no place in the psycho-personal, and I agree with him. He says, “there exists an abyss that justice in itself does not at all ask us to traverse” (*Forgiveness* 63). This abyss is the abyss of the irrational and the psychological. But, as I show below, remorse, forgiveness, and justice together lead to ethical reparation and ethical resiliency, under the larger structure of ethical evolution. The purpose of justice is to ensure that wrongs are corrected; its function is to repair the rupture of values caused by evil in lieu of temporal becoming, just as the purpose of remorse and forgiveness is to repair the rupture of the psyche, as well as the psycho-temporal. Justice should not be an obstacle to becoming, but a rational force that expedites ethical evolution while also providing security for the general public. Because the public will never get to know the pain and the idiosyncrasies

of the evil between the offender and the offended, it obliges the public to confront evil in a manner other than by irrational remorse and forgiveness, namely, through rational and reparational justice.

Part Two:

Having laid out the preliminary foundation for the explication of ethical evolution, I now discuss each equiprimordial moment of ethical evolution, and illustrate ethical reparation and ethical resiliency. I further demonstrate how the temporal rupture generated by evil is only fully repaired and overcome when ethical evolution occurs. In other words, the irrationality of remorse and forgiveness renovates the psychological rupture, and rational justice remedies the rupture of values. There are temporal aspects to both the psyche and our shared values, and the temporal aspect of each gets repaired by its respective ethical partition. But, for a total and complete repair of the temporal rupture, we need a holistic conjoining of all moments together in the form of ethical evolution.

There are three parties that emanate when evil is committed; each of these parties introduces a moment of ethical evolution. There is the offender that feels remorse, the offended who forgives, and the adjudicator who enacts justice. Each of these three parties can either be individuals, or collectives; there can be more than one offender, a number of those offended, and a singular or multiple mediating adjudicators.⁶ Each has the potential to generate a moment, that when considered all together, constitute the tripartite moments of the equiprimordial structure of ethical evolution. However, each can exist and function on its own without the association of the others. One can feel remorseful without being forgiven or brought to justice for their evil behaviour. One can forgive beyond a conception of justice without their offender feeling remorse. Justice can be served between the offender

and offended without either feeling remorse or giving forgiveness. This is often the case when the state is obliged to prosecute a suspect without the alleged victim filing formal charges. Justice often supersedes the will of suspects and victims as the legal representative of the public and its values, as they are codified in law (Rawls 209). Each moment of its respective party brings its own ethical power forth to confront evil. Yet, separately, they are impotent in confronting and mending the total of ruptures produced by evil. Only by integrating them into a single structure is it possible to authentically exercise the movement of ethical evolution, from which ethical reparation and ethical resiliency follow.

As I have been saying in accord with Jankélévitch's position, remorse announces the virtuality of a new and better life; it is the human virtue necessary for the evolution of the psyche and overcoming evil. It is the psychic turning point in the ethical life of the offender toward the realization that evil exists, that we ought not commit evil deeds, and that we have the virtuality to be better people (*The Bad Conscience* 58). Remorse is nonetheless the most painful and sufferable of psychic experiences. Jankélévitch claims that, "[r]emorse is thus pure despair, and yet to have remorse is a symptom of recovery" (*The Bad Conscience* 161). That being said, there is no restoration to the psychic and ethical position one was in before remorse awakened them from the indifference of baseline consciousness. Real restoration is impossible after remorse (*The Bad Conscience* 54). Irreversibility and irrevocability are the primary attributes of remorse responsible for psychic suffering and for why we cannot be restored to a state of affairs that existed in a time before. Jankélévitch describes them as "two authentic torments: the *anguish* that is the torment of irreversibility, and the *obsession* that is the torment of irrevocability" (*The Bad Conscience* 55). By irreversibility, Jankélévitch is simply referring to the temporal impossibility

of undoing an act, or reversing the directionality of time, and the acts committed over time. Irrevocability is a pathological repetition which dwells upon the evil deed. It is the desire to go back to a previous psychic state, and wish that the suffering will cease to be; it is scrupulous and obstructs the temporality of becoming. The fact that the offender cannot be restored means that he can only move forward and be changed forever for having done an evil deed. To truly accord with the flow of time, he must give in to "temporal forgiveness," and allow himself to be moved along with his torturous suffering without appealing to intellection and consolation (Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness* 20).

Jankélévitch posits that consolation and rationalizing remorse leads to ethical limitation and inauthentic comforting. On this, he says, "[i]t is a question of empiricizing the meta-empirical wound... reducing it to traumatism" (*The Bad Conscience* 66). In other words, by attempting to make sense of our suffering and to excuse our acts through scrupulous intellection, we reduce and limit the larger whole of the lived experience of our remorse and neglect the seriousness of evil. To Jankélévitch, rational intellection limits the ethical possibilities that, temporally and virtually, lie beyond suffering remorse. I concur with this position, partly. To discount the psycho-irrational would hinder our ethical possibilities, but I also think that disregarding the potential for rationality to have a meaningful impact upon our ethical lives is, in fact, ethical limitation - hence the necessity for justice as the representative of the ethical force of rationality. In any case, remorse should be left as an experientially lived, irrational component to ethical evolution which commences the inauguration of the virtuality of overcoming evil. The offender has no right to intellectualize their remorse; they feel it, and ought to feel it, as a consequence of their behaviour that violated the values etched into their psyche. There is no going back after evil has

been committed; there is only going forward into the future and remorse catalyzes the movement toward overcoming the evil done. What we take away from remorse in regards of ethical evolution is how it is the starting point for movement of evolution. Suffering remorse demands that change occurs, that evolution occurs. However, this is not something that can be done by the will of the offender. Forgiveness, as Jankélévitch says, is the human grace that absolves the offender of his remorse and permits evolution and the overcoming of evil (*Forgiveness* 34).

Jankélévitch posits that pure forgiveness is the only thing in the world that can truly absolve someone of remorse: “to forgive is to release the guilty one from his punishment” (*Forgiveness* 10). Forgiveness strips away the psychological remorse the offender feels, and it allows him the possibility to take claim to becoming a better person. Indeed, it is possible that pure forgiveness as Jankélévitch conceives it has not even yet happened (*Forgiveness* 1). It is “an *event* that happens at such and such an instant of historical becoming” (Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness* 5). Jankélévitch asserts it is the event, out of the overflowing, irrational love of the offended, which allows the remorseful person to fall back into the general movement of temporal becoming and not stay victim to the torturous repetition of scrupulous irrevocability (Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness* 6). The offended also liberates himself from his own rancorous torment by forgiving. He no longer holds onto the past with resentment after having forgiven the offender; “forgiveness serves to liquidate *ressentiment* for [the offended]” (Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness* 115).

Jankélévitch makes the distinction between pure forgiveness and “apocryphal forgivings,” the most important of which is intellective excuse. Intellective excuse is a kind of forgiveness that holds rancor “that has not yet succeeded in resolving” (Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness* 20). As with remorse, forgiveness must be absent of any intellection, except the threshold required to know that one is forgiving. On this, Jankélévitch says, “for forgiveness, there is everything to forgive, and there is almost nothing to understand... [t]o forgive, indeed, is to understand a little bit!” (*Forgiveness* 88). By pure forgiveness, Jankélévitch means to say forgiveness that is not predicated upon a reason for why one would forgive another, unlike justice, as it is predicated

upon the law. That is to say forgiveness must be spontaneous and out of abundant love for humankind. The purity of forgiveness is why Jankélévitch thinks that it is an event that has not yet come to pass in human history. However, I think that it would be limiting

“forgiveness from the heart fills all the instants of our social and private lives; it softens the intransigence of the law, [and] protects us from an inhumane eternity

(*The Bad Conscience* 145)

our ethical imagination to think that forgiveness is this far-out, fantastic, nearly impossible event that borders upon the metaphysical and transcendental. It would do much better for the purpose of overcoming evil, not to completely neglect the purity of forgiveness, but at least to give it the breathing room to be an event that human beings are capable of giving to a remorseful offender who has committed evil. I agree that forgiveness should not be predicated on a reason to forgive, and that it should be pure forgiveness and affirm itself tautologically on the basis of itself. Forgiveness forgives because it is forgiveness; it is pure, unaltered and without

formal prescription, unlike justice which has its origins in the codification of the reasonable law. Not only is forgiveness a pure moment, but it is “a gracious gift from the offender to the offended... a personal relation with another person” (Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness* 5). Between the offender and the offended exists a personal relation which the public has no access to in any respect. Certainly, this is the beauty of the irrational aspect of the human condition, but it is also a reason that justifies the role of the public in confronting evil. As Jankélévitch maintains, it is only on the basis of a personal, pure, gracious gift that forgiveness has its true potency to absolve the offender of remorse and to “[undo] the last shackles that tie us down to the past, draw us backward, and hold us down” (*Forgiveness* 15). Justice is not a gift to the offender, nor even to the offended; it is something different altogether. John Rawls said it most simply and profoundly on justice in the first line of his magnum opus *A Theory of Justice*, when he affirms, “[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (3). This powerful insight asserts that justice is the primary foundation for a social organization that can withstand the slings and arrows of erroneous acts of evil, just as truth must withstand the corruption of falsity. Justice is an impersonal, impartial, calculating ethical machine that bears witness to evil and responds to evil as a third party, representing the values of the public. It is the manifestation of the needs and will of the people as the will of the people is described and delineated in the law. Dewey compliments this claim of Rawls when he says, “[o]fficials are those who look out for and take care of the interests thus affected. Since those who are indirectly affected are not direct participants in the transactions in question, it is necessary that certain persons be apart to represent them, and see to it that their interests are conserved and protected” (*TPP* 16). These officials Dewey speaks of are, of course,

adjudicators who specialize in jurisprudence. Adjudicators look out for the material and ideal interests of the offender, offended, and the public through justice. As the public is faced with evil, it is necessary that justice be institutionalized and represented by adjudicating officials, who to the best of their ability, enact punishments and reparations that accord with the value-system of the public through the law. Just as we have those who specialize in other forms of social institutions such as teachers who ensure the minimization of ignorance for the public, and doctors who protect the public against illness, we have adjudicators for whom justice and the prescription of law is their sole purpose as the bastion against evil for the public.

If we do not have institutionalized, rational justice, we bequeath all value judgements to the irrational psyche. The personal, irrational, and psychological aspects of humanity are ill-equipped to negotiate the intricacies of evil, and dissect evil acts in order to come upon an appropriate response that coheres with the value-system of the public. But this assessment goes both ways. We cannot simply have the rationalizing and independent machinery of justice that squashes the psychological, personal and irrational aspects of our nature. Neither the irrationality of the psyche, nor the rationality of justice should be subordinate to the other. Both should operate harmoniously in cohesion with the one another in a single effort to repair the lives of those affected by evil, and to prevent against evil in the future.

Speaking of forgiveness and its effects upon the law, Jankélévitch goes as far as to say that, “forgiveness from the heart fills all the instants of our social and private lives; it softens the intransigence of the law, [and] protects us from an inhumane eternity” (*The Bad Conscience* 145). I concur with him on this part, as I believe Rawls does as well when he says, “[t]he concept

of rationality by itself is not an adequate basis for the concept of right” (404). Indeed, to refuse Jankélévitch’s point would amount to saying that the irrational and rational components of negotiating evil cannot be integrated, but must flank evil from two different sides without ever meeting on the field as a single force. Or in Rawls’ language, the concept of something, namely an act being right, cannot solely exist on the basis of rational thought; it requires another element combined with it to achieve its full potency. When the offender is forgiven by the offended as he serves his prison sentence, it absolves the offender of his remorse, and it also shows the public how the overflowing love that is virtual in all human beings can forgive the inexcusable. For evil can be inexcusable, in that no amount of rational intellection can give justification for an act, but nonetheless forgivable (Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness* 106). Forgiveness, as the gracious, loving gift of the human heart, is the bastion of hope for the human species that signals we can overcome any trial and any tribulation, no matter the cost it inflicts upon us. So, just as the law can supersede the will of the offended and charge an offender with a crime absent of formal charges by the offended, the offended can forgive, beyond the comprehension of the law, not necessarily in spite of the law, but beyond the rational apperception of the values a people share as they are codified in the law. Where the law and justice are prescriptive and expect in advance how to negotiate evil, forgiveness forgives regardless of the deed, without the need for asking why. Justice is scrupulous and investigative, where forgiveness is spontaneous. Without forgiveness, there is no personal relationship between the offender and offended that overcomes evil and repairs the psycho-temporal rupture. And, without justice, there is no reparation of values, nor a temporal reparation for the public so that they may get on with their normal lives. Conjoining all three equiprimordial moments

together, we have ethical evolution which will repair the lives of those affected and those who bore witness, and will allow a people to be more resilient to the evil they have already suffered.

Jankélévitch makes it clear that both the offender and the offended must “consent to becoming and [renounce] the delight of constant repetition [and] [make] fluid the advent of the future and [lubricate] the succession of the before and after” if we are to seal the rupture of the psyche, and allow the offender and offended to get back into the flow of temporal becoming (*Forgiveness* 21). I take this notion for granted and take it one step further and make it a condition of the institutions of justice to “lubricate the succession of the before and after.” Ethical evolution is not merely a transformation via remorse, forgiveness, and justice. It is a modification of a people, along with the values which they understand the world by, that broadens their horizons of what is right and wrong leading to ethical reparation and ethical resiliency. In the broadening of their horizons, a people are able to imagine possibilities that they could not before, and see those possibilities that were once invisible to them. When the Allies liberated the Nazi death camps, the imagination of the West as to the depth of what human beings were capable of was changed forever. The evil of the Nazis sponsored the ethical evolution of the West to the extent that the Milgram experiments were conducted to study the capacity of the human being to do evil acts. As I have been suggesting, evolution, in the ethical context, implies reparation and resiliency. The subtly between restoration and reparation lies in the temporal facticity of irrevocability and irreversibility. Restoration occurs when a debt is paid back, or when things are made again just as they were before. A computer hard drive can be restored after having been corrupted by a virus; a human being is repaired after having suffered evil. Justice, recognizing it will not be able to give a person her partner back after a

murder, largely attempts to restore a situation to a condition it was in before via punishment and restitution, without the lived duration between the offended and the offender. Without the personal, irrational moments of ethical evolution, justice is a temporally impotent form of reparation that cannot seal the temporal rupture caused by evil on its own. Only through a pure remorse that desires to overcome suffering, and with a pure forgiveness that forgiveness regardless of the deed, and a judicial decision that accords with a people's values is there a holistic sealing of the temporal rupture caused by evil.

We can analogously think of the difference between reparation and restoration when we consider the Japanese art of "Kintsugi." Kintsugi is the art of repairing broken pottery with gold lacquer. For example, a broken bowl would be put back together, but not to make it look the same as it did before. The gold lacquer is used to seal the cracks between the pieces, highlighting the imperfections in the piece and acknowledging the fact that it has been broken. In Kintsugi, the imperfections and brokenness of objects are made to be desirable and thought of as distinguished. Kintsugi does not attempt to make the objects the same as they were before, but it rather embraces the brokenness of the object and makes it more beautiful than it was previously. Like Kintsugi, human beings who have suffered evil are not restored to be the same as they were, but are repaired to be better than they were once before. They are transformed from an ordinary existence into one marked by struggle and the beauty of reparation. Reparation makes us better than we were before. We can

also consider Nietzsche's slightly hyperbolic claim in terms of reparation when he says, "that which does not kill us makes us stronger" (*The Portable Nietzsche* 680).

The virtue of remorse lies in it being the catalyst of ethical evolution, whereby we can always choose to do better in the future, in lieu of being remorseful for past evil deeds. Dewey agrees with Jankélévitch that we learn from making mistakes when he says, "[f]ailure is instructive. The person who really thinks learns quite as much from his failures as from his successes" (*Essential Dewey* 142). The virtue of forgiveness lies in the gracious gift it gives to the offender to lubricate the potentiality for temporal becoming and sealing the psychic rupture caused by evil, while also contributing to the healing of the temporal rupture. Lastly, the virtue of justice lies in the public bearing witness to evil, and to the best of the public's ability, repair the lives of those affected by evil with rational insight, helping and encouraging everyone to get on with their regular lives, even though they are forever changed. When confronted with the rupture of our values, it is incumbent upon the representatives of our values to come forward, and to the best of their ability, make sense of evil scrupulously through the law as the institutionalized, linguistic embodiment of our values (Rawls 208). In asking the most of the representatives of our values, we must also ask the most of those offended – to forgive. Lives are affected by evil and this demands a genuine and earnest response by human beings to do their best to confront it with the whole of their being. Lives are taken by evil acts and only through justice and forgiveness

can we repair the lives of people affected by evil so they may get on with their lives as they did once before; but of course, their existences will never be the same. It will never be the same and they will also know how and why they will never be the same. As Jankélévitch says “[reparation] does not give us the joy that preceded this pain”

(*The Bad Conscience* 67). But being repaired does give us the ability to oppose the kind of evil we have already suffered and borne witness to in the future. A people’s resiliency to confront evil is multiplied for having suffered it. This notion is as simple as saying, “fool me once shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.”

Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown how ethical evolution requires that we suffer the slings and arrows of evil to become ever more resilient to it in the future, and to become ethically better people ourselves through reparation. Jankélévitch sums the entirety of ethical evolution up best when he says, “[a]s long as becoming is a continual creation turned toward the future, it counsels us simply to welcome something else, to think of something else, to open ourselves up to the alterity of the next day” (*Forgiveness* 21). To suffer and be burnt to ashes is what allows the Phoenix to rise, stronger and more durable than before. In another fitting passage, Jankélévitch says, “pain, although it comes from an impotence, still represents a relative success of life, it is a good sign to be able to suffer” (*The Bad Conscience* 115). Dewey echoes this sentiment, expressing, “[t]he good man is the man who, no matter how morally unworthy he has been, is moving to become better” (Dewey *TED* 180). He is right. If we did not suffer, we would have no reason to become better people, nor to face evil in the hopes that we would not have another Holocaust or 9/11. It is on the basis of human suffering that human beings are catalyzed to repair themselves, allowing themselves to be more resilient against evil. Just as in psychotherapy where the analysand can recognize the triggers of a historically

conditioned pain, a people who share values, after being subject to the terror of evil, will be able to know that same evil as it creeps upon their horizon. One only builds a castle knowing that they have the potential to be invaded, or that they have been invaded before. As human beings, we will always do, be victims to, and have to confront, evil. Our worlds will be shaken and we will be called upon to answer the challenge of resisting the forces of evil. Through ethical evolution, our scars will heal, we will become stronger against the violence rallied against us, all the while swiftly moving along with the sands of time, never able to remain the same, but continually becoming more excellent for suffering, and having, suffered the ruptures of evil.

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